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Nursing, medicine and health care systems are confronted
with complex and interrelated challenges of information and
biotechnologies, socio-economic and moral ethical issues.
The international nursing community has responded to these
changes with new modalities of practice and provided for
preparation in moral ethical decision making. Execution of
decisions, and more importantly, actuation of moral agency
in commitive and creative ways, has not received due
emphasis. The challenges confronting the nurse as moral
agent and how best to prepare nurses for commitive and
creative moral practice raise many ethical questions:
1. In what ways does knowledge of the nature of the person
facilitate the reflective nurse as moral agent to
actualise that agency in practice situations?
2. What internal qualities maintain to inform and move or
inhibit the moral agent in actuation of practice choices
and creative responses to practice challenges?
3. What is the structure of a process-oriented framework of
knowledge, concepts and skills needed for educational
preparation for actuation of moral agency?
The purpose of this thesis was to explore concepts involved
in a system of meaning called moral agency in nursing
practice and to identify the meaning of, and means for, the
commitive and creative actuation of moral ethical agency.
The interrelated components of the ontology of person and
moral agency were addressed as indicating aspects of a
conceptual framework that focuses on actuation of the
appropriately reasoned moral decision, the nature of
commitive moral agency and facilitators and constraints to
ethical actions. Based on analysis and insights from
experience and the literature, the framework was seen as
including concepts of person and self-identity, virtue and
ethics of virtue in relation to practice, the actuation of
moral agency and the nature of creative moral agency.
From the analysis of the ontology of person, the reflective
nurse as moral agent actualises agency by knowing oneself as
being based in the dimensions of person, self and I.
Particularly the I, as manifest in autonomy, accountability
and responsibility, is significant to actualisation of
agency. The development of self identity by strong
evaluations, articulating a clear moral ideal and
principles of practice, embodying virtues in a form of life,
a way of life and style of life which sustain and imbue
practice are all pertinent to actualisation of agency.
Internal qualities influencing the moral agent to empowered
choice and action include the shared values and virtues as
habits of being and character. The virtues inherent in being
wholly engaged in practice and in animating and energising
the effects of the spirit as affecting a person's activity
and agency indicate the importance of the spiritual
dimension in nursing. In the analysis, guilt and shame are
described as inhibitors to agency; the dimensions of hope
are revealed as facilitators of agency by linking hope's
effects in the spirit and shared life.
In the study the need is indicated for critical analysis of
the presuppositions of nursing philosophy and curricula,
and clearer articulation and provision for the implications
for pluralistic and naturalistic emphases. An
intersubjective relational ontology of person provides the
basis for sound hope and offers a framework for the
development of the integrally spiritual being. The
reflective nurse as moral agent with the internal qualities
which empower commitive agency can confront practice needs
with principled and creative moral agency to provide
paradigmatic responses to care.
The components of the framework developed from the analysis
include:
Delineation or discrimination of the dimensions of
person and personal identity
Articulation of the moral ideal of nursing and
principles of practice
Role and models of virtues acquisition and habituation
Discernment of the individual and corporate values in
relation to goals and means
Identification and understanding of exemplars
Portfolios and case studies of exemplary practice
Use of a model that relates essential shared values of
nursing to attitudes, personal qualities and examples of
behaviours is recommended. The attitudes and qualities are
attributes of character addressed as virtues which empower
the person to enact values in practice. The confluent theory
of values and phases of development for goals and means
values are suggested for the discernment of personal and
organisational transformation.
The significance, and desired outcome of the study, is to
initiate professional dialogue which would focus on the
development of agency for actuation of moral decisions and
ethical actions, encouraging and calling forth the fullest
articulation and epitomisations of strong evaluations and
choices in areas of yet-to-be-defined nursing practice. The
profession is challenged to address the expression of care
as an experiment in paradigmity.
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ETHICS IN NURSING EDUCATION AS REQUISITE FOR THE
COMMITIVE AND CREATIVE MORAL PRACTITIONER
Seed for the planting must not be ground.
X Saatfruchte sollen nicht vermablen werden.
L-.
Goethe
Professional practice, theories and research exist today in
a climate of flux, with radical changes in the medical
profession and health care delivery systems. Shifting
paradigms of scientific and philosophical theories place
renewed requirements on the articulation of the meaning of
concepts foundational to all aspects of professional
practice. Educators are challenged to re-examine the
epistemologic basis of approaches to theoretic and clinical
instruction. Qualitative approaches to nursing research
are deemed increasingly important and the justification for
quantitative study is questioned as not as inherently
objective as previously maintained.
The study of ethics is not untouched by these influences.
Because of these changes, it is no longer sufficient for
nurses to be prepared to engage moral discourse at the
level of values. In addition, articulation of principles
directing actions and discussion of meta-ethical issues
(Kieffer, 1979) are being mandated by the nature and scope
of twenty-first century changes. These emerging social and
health care practice issues are confronting the
practitioner with challenges to meta-ethical discourse,
that is, why and how should one be ethical.
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In the past, the nursing profession as an international
community of scholars, researchers, and practitioners
confronted with changing demands, made serious effort and
meaningful progress in the education of professional nurses
for analysis and decision making for moral practice.
During the middle to late 1960s, rapid advances in
biotechnology presented challenging situations of moral
ethical choices to medical and nursing practice.
Initially, nurses had little involvement in bioethical
decisions and limited awareness of necessary elements for
ethical decision making. However, they were directly
involved in carrying out these decisions in the care of
patients. Prominent case examples of this situation were
instances in which infants with Downs' Syndrome or
anacephalaly were allowed to die without feeding. Because
these technologies involved patients at the edges of life
and death, bioethical decisions were regarded and addressed
primarily as issues of medical ethics. The abandonment of
care of those being allowed to die to nurses and family
members was denounced as itself immoral by some physicians
(Gordon, 1979 & Pellegrino, 1979) and ethicists (Ramsey,
1970 & Gustafsen, 1973) as breach of the contract or
covenant of care.
Efforts to analyse the nature of the patient as a
compromised and vulnerable person (Ramsey (1970), and the
nature of the relationship of patient to professional
caregivers (Maclntyre, 1977; Pellegrino, 1977) helped to
clarify the necessary involvement of the nurse and to
demonstrate distinctive issues related to nursing practice.
Nurses' professional awareness was drawn again to the
concept of person because of guality of life issues and the
attempts by some ethicists to relate life and death
decisions to the presence or absence of a minimal set of
gualities or characteristics essential for personhood.
2
Currently, issues of the patient as a moral person are
being considered in relation to a patient's candidacy for
organ transplants in order to achieve just utilisation of
scarce resources.
While these discussions of the nature of the person
revealed important concepts for practice, the focus was
primarily on the philosophical analysis of the interrelated
aspects of patient as person. Practitioners were
essentially lacking in this perspective because in nursing
as well as the other health care disciplines, knowledge of
the human being was taught from the viewpoint of the
biological and psychosocial sciences, incorporating some
knowledge from liberal arts and humanities courses. Nurses
might not choose to pursue study in philosophy of man, or
more specifically, the nature of person. Yet, nurses are
being confronted again with issues that require knowledge
of the nature of person that goes beyond the selective
perspectives or focus of each individual science. It is
precisely because 'person' is a philosophical or
metaphysical concept that the empirical descriptions of
human behaviour in the various sciences cannot be adequate
accounts of the person. Further, given the conditions
described above, there is an increasing need to focus on
the nurse as person, especially from the viewpoint of
agency for actuation of moral ethical decisions in rapidly
changing professional practice.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, nurse preparation
increasingly included ethics for decision making in
practice through values analysis, moral reasoning, and
principle-based judgements of nursing ethics as well as
other health related practice issues. Although more
prepared to make nurse-patient focused, principle-based
moral ethical decisions, the nurse as a moral agent is
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confronted with intrapersonal and institutional challenges
and barriers to actuation of informed moral agency. Part
of this challenge arises because nursing is still in the
process of establishing legitimacy (Habermas, 1975) as a
theory- and research-based profession, and is in need of
definition and congruency of the philosophical bases for
its professional practice.
The thesis of this study is that the being of person and
personal or self identity of the I myself form the bases
for actuation of moral agency. Further, the thesis proposed
is that these and their related concepts, which may be
presented in various interpretations, form part of a
framework of essential preparation of professional nurses.
The term 'framework' is used in the sense of a structured
but open work: a set of basic ideas. The concepts for one's
operative framework provide the explicit or implicit
background for one's moral judgements, intuitions, or
reactions in moral assessments. A framework for
educational preparation for enhanced actuation of moral
agency may provide the needed focus on moral ethical action
in response to these assessments. As a nurse who has
practiced for ten years in clinical nursing, nursing
supervision and occupational health, and twenty-five years
in postgraduate nursing education; and having been a
student for all these years; the writer has chosen concepts
and content that reflect lived experience, formal
preparation, and focused research of the emphasised topics.
The observations and analyses are from a mind formed in the
Judeo-Christian tradition and schooled to discriminate and
appreciate eclectic as well as selectively ideological
perspectives.
The dichotomy of approaches to the nature of person as a
4
'what' or as a 'relational being' recognises different sets
of presuppositions and assumptions for each. Acknowledging
the primacy of the practical as the goal or telos in the
nursing profession, the major emphasis is on the importance
of the inclusion of the nature of person as the
underpinning for the concepts of identity, agency, and
virtue in the one who practices in the care of vulnerable
patients or clients. The vision can be extended to include
the influence of nurses, as the largest group of health
care givers, being fully prepared to articulate informed
moral and ethical practice choices to policy makers and
potentially threatened groups of patients.
Changing health issues, delivery systems, institutions,
and traditions indicate the need for commitive and creative
moral agency in the practice of nursing. For the purpose of
this study, moral agency is the capacity and ability to
respond to practice situations in which moral problems
arise. By commitive moral agency is meant a readiness to
involve, to consign oneself to addressing the problems and
issues encountered in practice. Cua (1978) states that
creative moral agency refers to "the manner in which a
moral agent gualifies the function of moral principles in
coping with his situations" (p. 1). Moral creativity also
means the way in which the decisions involve the inner life
and personal vision; "the range of personal valuative acts:
the modes of being that constitute and in a sense create
personhood" (Cua, 1978, p.3). These concepts contribute
important dimensions to a framework of theories, whether
explicit or implicit, that inform our moral and especially
ethical judgements, intuitions, and responses.
Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to propose and analyse
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interrelated components of concepts of person and moral
agency, which are viewed as contributing to a conceptual
framework for nursing education and practice. The topics
and content areas developed in this analysis remain largely
unaddressed in nursing literature and nursing research. The
areas discussed in this work for development of a beginning
framework include concepts of person, especially as related
to self identity and actuation of moral agency. The nature
of practice and virtues in relation to creative moral
agency are envisioned as contributing important elements to
the outcome of the study. While the focus of this work is
on the actuation of the appropriately reasoned moral
decision, the nature of commitive moral agency, and
facilitators and constraints in ethical actions, it is
hoped that others in the profession will engage in dialogue
and conferences directed to a concerted effort to enhance
the role of agency in preparation of students and nurses in
practice.
The approach taken in this thesis is inductive and
expository. Research methods include a focused historical
review of literature as well as content and conceptual
analysis with applications in cases or practice examples.
The content and ideas presented are not an attempt at
systematic commentary, critique or synthesis although
critical commentary is included. In specific instances,
two types of approaches and content will each counter or
critique the other, as with the objectivist and relational
viewpoints; or the good and right as the basis for moral
evaluations. There will be readers whose previous study
and experiences will inform their choice of perspective.
Transformative learning for the adult learner involves
study and active reflections to assess one's meaning schema
and meaning perspectives. The seed is presented as source
for meaning assessment. The acknowledged possibility is
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that after reflection, one's schema and perspectives may be
modified. It is also to be anticipated that the readers
may find that they are prepared after reflection to
reaffirm their previously acquired meaning schema and
perspectives.
For the same reasons, although the writer's organisation
and sequence of the texts are enlightened by exposure over
the years to these and other writings, the thoughts
presented may not be and certainly do not claim to be at
all points congruent with the authors. Sources of an
eclectic nature (based in Western and Oriental, Christian
and non-Christian philosophies) are used to structure
arguments for the need of the profession to study
systematically the conditions for and barriers to moral
creativity. The choice of approach from the ontology of
the person may seem far removed from practical
consideration; and other specific ontologies and related
materials could be selected to discuss the concept
of person and personal identity. The intention is to bring
to attention and encourage dialogue on these concepts among
nursing scholars and practitioners.
The purpose in the following chapter is to review the
developments in nursing ethics as background to
demonstrate the nursing profession's focus and formidable
efforts for values and standards in moral practice. The
developments demonstrate as well the lack of emphasis on
the virtues and other aspects to enhance potential for
agency in nursing practice. Questions for exploration in
the analysis are presented as cues or guides to focus
attention on seeds to be gleaned in the subsequent
chapters.
In Chapter Three, the ontology of person and personal
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identity in the metaphysical anaysis of Weiss's Privacy
(1983) and the phenomenological analysis of Stein (1989a)
are discussed. Weiss' use of the term 'privacy' does not
involve ideas of the individual sphere as the correction
for public rationalism or communal existence, nor as the
construction of a non-political realm of the private in
which the actor can express selfishness, elitism, or
creativity (Rorty, 1982). In this view, the private is
necessary for development of the innovative or
transgressive ideas held in check and structured by the
public. These ideas have been critiqued by Fraser (1989)
as an effort to sustain one view of autonomy as one aspect
of the person. Rather, Weiss' use of privacy and the
concern in this thesis is to describe the dimensions of
person and he has infused the topic with the fresh language
of a fully non-reductionistic analysis. His analysis of
person is a capstone for his earlier analyses of the
person, especially in social and political relations
(Weiss, 1980).
Stein (1989a) applied her preparation in both scientific
psychology and Husserlian phenomemological analysis to the
nature and understanding of person in the process of
empathy. She explicitly demonstrated the inadequacy of the
then current scientific theories in the study of the intra-
and inter-personal aspects of empathic knowing. These two
types of approaches are contrasted in relation to the
nature of person and personal identity as a basis for
discussion of values and virtues in the actuation of moral
agency. The nature of and influences of self-identity are
presented in the analyses of Charles Taylor (1976, 1989).
His representation of the formation of identity in strong
and repeated evaluations seems to resonate in the
experiences of nursing students and staff.
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Chapter Four is an examination of the multiform role of the
virtues and the nature of practice (Maclntyre, 1985) in
relation to moral agency. Commitment and moral creativity
for ethical practice as supported by the structure of one's
life is proposed in Chapter Five, based upon the work of
Anthony Cua (1978). The influence of shame and guilt as
barriers and of hope as facilitator to enactment of
personal agency are examples of a range of such factors in
each of these categories of influence on action.
Finally, in Chapter Six the elements discussed in the
thesis are reiterated as proposed components of a beginning
framework for commitive and creative moral agency in
nursing education and practice. Implications of the
proposed framework are discussed using examples of nurses
who actualised agency in ways that created new paradigms of
care. The implications of the analyses for nursing are
viewed as heuristic for future education and practice.
The ideas and examples throughout this work are presented
as seeds for the sowing, not ground by definitive critique;
indeed, most are part of the ongoing dialectic in the
literature of each component. Nor are these all the
possible seeds to be sown, as other related aspects of the
concepts remain as challenges for future development.
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CHAPTER TWO
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS IN NURSING
Moral practice takes place within the context of day to
day, person to person contacts in the communications, care
and decisions of nursing practice. The international
community of nurses has been diligent in providing
leadership for nursing ethics. In the United Kingdom, the
Ethics Forum of the Royal College of Nursing was
established in 1991 to address the issues that nurses face
in clinical practice. The Institute of Medical Ethics
focused on the teaching of nursing ethics and highlighted
the significance of nursing ethics content for practice.
Subseguently, in 1991 the National Health Service funded
the National Centre for Nursing Ethics to address issues
of nursing practice. More recently, the European Centre
for Professional Ethics was launched with the aim to
provide a multidisciplinary forum for research and
education in professional ethics, focusing especially on
nursing. Within the European community, the University of
Pamplona in Spain, conjointly with the University of
Edinburgh, developed through the ERASMUS Project an all-
European concern for ethics in nursing practice. The
Nordic countries, Finland and Sweden in particular, have
evidenced their concern for ethics in nursing through the
development of Codes of Nursing Practice, workshops,
invited speakers, and other fora to explore relevant issues
in nursing ethics. These are only a few examples of the
developing interest and growing life of nursing ethics that
indicate the strong heart of the nursing profession in
relation to its moral life and stance.
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Preparation of nurses to practice as moral agents is
essentially related to the present and future development
of nursing ethics. In the following sections, an overview
of the context, progression, special characteristics and
focus of ethics preparation in nursing is presented to
delineate more clearly the need for a greater emphasis on
the person of the nurse as the basis for commitive and
creative moral agency. The overview reveals a strong
foundation upon which nursing leaders can build to extend
the academic preparation and practice experiences of
professional nurses in order to enable and facilitate moral
creativity in response to changing and emergent needs.
Teaching of Ethics in Nursing
In response to the need for increased involvement of nurses
in clinical moral issues and decisions, a variety of
activities were initiated to prepare nurses to be more
knowledgeable in ethical analysis and decision making.
Examples of this in the United States include the
preparation of nurses in ethics in special programmes of
the Kennedy Institute for Ethics, and fellowships for study
of bioethics at the Hastings Centre Institute of Society,
Ethics and the Life Sciences and at Harvard University.
Subsequently, there have been a number of conferences and
reports on the teaching of ethics in nursing curricula
(Stanley, 1978; Beardslee, 1983; Rodmell, 1985; and
Gallagher & Boyd, 1991). In the early application of
ethics teaching, the content and emphasis was on medical
bioethical issues and decisions. Moral theories, moral
reasoning and the application of principles and rules in
decision making were stressed. In the ensuing years, nurse
education has attended rather unevenly to some of the
recommended areas of teaching designed to develop the
professional role and heighten individual commitment to
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areas of social concern. Nursing curricula that do reflect
this emphasis include content and experiences in the
analysis and critique of social and economic structures and
institutional settings in which services are provided;
analysis of issues such as allocation of resources and
distribution of services; disciplined self-regulation,
development and enforcement of standards and procedures;
and issues of professional character in management of
professional problems (May, 1980).
Fry (1989) describes four contemporary models of teaching
ethics that emerged in this period: the Moral Concepts
Model, Moral Issues Model, Clinical Practice Model, and
Ethics Inquiry Model. The Moral Concepts Model includes
historical foundations of codes of ethics, the value
dimensions of nursing, and ethical decision making. The
Moral Issues Model addresses foundations of ethics, moral
problems in health care relationships, and issues of moral
concern in health care such as abortion, in vitro
fertilisation, surrogate motherhood, and other like
concerns. The Clinical Practice Model uses ethics teaching
approaches such as clinical conference, case study
presentations, and ethics rounds to focus on moral issues
in care of specific patients. The Ethics Inquiry Model
focuses on forms of inquiry, questions of methods, and
relationships to other forms such as scientific inquiry.
The teaching of ethics was facilitated by the emergence of
a number of texts on the subject of nursing ethics. Fry
(1989) noted categories of authorship, to which subsequent
texts have been added. Some texts were developed by
philosopher-nurse teams (J. B. Thompson & H. 0. Thompson,
1981; Thompson, Melia & Boyd, 1983, 1988; Benjamin &
Curtin, 1981, 1986; Downie, Caiman & Schrock, 1987;
Veatch, & Fry, 1987; and Husted & Husted, 1991, 1995).
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Nurses authored texts alone (Davis & Aroskar, 1983;
Tschudin, 1986), and texts were developed by philosopher
teachers of nursing ethics (Muyskens, 1982 & Jameton,
1984). Most of these texts also placed major emphasis on
more traditional clinical medical ethical dilemmas such as
abortion, euthanasia, and termination of life support, and
not on nursing ethics in everyday practice. The second
edition of the Husted and Husted (1995) text is noteworthy
for chapters on the value of virtue and the role of agency.
Another category can be added to Fry's list with the
publication of a nurse edited text (Tschudin, 1993), the
first of a series that explores ethical issues confronting
practicing nurses and Project 2000 students through
application of theories and concepts by critical analysis
of case histories. Noteworthy as well is the Tschudin and
Farr (1994) continuing education series in nursing ethics
in the Royal College of Nursing weekly, Nursing Standard.
Reports on the use of specific teaching models (Aroskar,
1977; Frisch, 1987; Fry, 1989), aides such as case studies
(Veatch & Fry, 1987; Waithe, et al, 1989), and teaching
strategies (Penderson, Duckett & Maruyama, 1990) represent
topics in a rapidly increasing literature on curriculum and
teaching of ethics (Pence, 1986).
The ongoing accomplishments and integration of the
knowledge, tools and experiences developed to date are used
to strengthen and restructure curriculum models and
approaches (Gaul, 1989; Quinn, 1990; Rodmell, 1988). For
example, Rodmell (1988) developed an Ethical Analysis
Framework and Model which combines ethical
constructs/components for nursing practice with five
validation criteria to ensure that an ethical perspective
is incorporated into all models of nursing. Ethical
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constructs are presented in categories representing Respect
for Person, Liberty/Freedom, Autonomy, Truth-tel1inq, and
Justice. The five criteria to be applied to the ethical
constructs include: Use/knowledge of model and constructs,
Linguistic interpretation, Measureable behaviour, Adequate
sampling by qualified, experienced personnel, and Content
consistently presented.
Preferred cognitive, effective and affective outcomes are
indicated for each of the criteria. The emphasis on
effective is to alert the reader to the inclusion of
actions to effect the desired outcome as a distinctive and
commendable feature of Rodmell's model. The outcome for
the Use/knowledge of model and constructs criterion is
that: the Patient/client/advocate/trustee realises maximum
health potential. Linguistic interpretation is evaluated
by the outcome: Definitions clearly articulated and
understood by patient/ client/ advocate/ trustee. The
criterion. Measurable behaviour, has as outcome that:
Desired changes are realised and inferred from
patient/client/advocate/ trustee. Adequate sampling by
qualified, experienced personnel is assessed by the outcome
that: Patient/client/advocate/trustee is facilitated to
participate in health care decisions. The criterion
Content consistently presented is measured by the outcome:
Patient/ client/ advocate/ trustee accepts consistent
information.
Although needing testing and elaboration by application and
research, the Rodmell Ethical Analysis Framework has been
presented in detail as an example of a nursing-focused
model of ethical constructs, which includes criteria and
outcomes in order to guide nurses' implementation of these
guidelines in education and in the practice of nursing in
clinical and community settings. Also, Rodmell's use of
the term 'constructs' raises consciousness of a range of
related concepts and allows for the possibility of treating
not only the values aspect but also the virtues aspects of
the concepts within each construct.
While Rodmell addresses ethical constructs, curricula for
nurse education have tended to be focus on values and
values clarification. As will be discussed in the following
section, the focus on the virtues related to practice is
a neglected aspect of moral ethical teaching as it has
developed in nursing education, and the emphasis on the
virtues is viewed as an essential dimension for creative
moral agency.
Values and Virtues in Nursing Education and Practice
Not only did nursing education mirror developments in
medical bioethics but also the emphasis on values. The
values addressed were related to the special character of
patients' needs and to the duties of the nurse in meeting
patients' needs. The moral reasoning procedure applied to
arrive at decisions was based on the weighing of different
values and the conseguences of the decisions to the values.
The characteristics of value were taught as: indicating
what is judged to be "the good", implying preference and
being supported by rational justification, countenancing
strong feelings and intense attitudes, and specifying a
course of action (Kieffer, 1979). The expectation was that
if the common values were articulated clearly and guided
an ethical decision making process that was sufficiently
thorough and circumspect, then the moral decision would be
both appropriate and enacted. As guides to action, values
were expected to enable or empower the implementation of
the decision. The analysis of other factors of agency is
a primary focus of this thesis.
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Because uncertainty in values and lack of common values
clouded appropriate statements of principles, values
clarification was viewed as a necessary part of educational
preparation (Uustal, 1978; Steele & Harmon, 1983).
Critiques of the emphasis on values stressed the lack of
discussion of the relationship of stated values to a sense
of right or principles such as justice or fairness. The
process of values clarification has been criticised also
for being too abstract and academic because unrelated to
practice. In response, improved strategies for value
analysis were proposed (Frisch, 1987). This was advocating
more or better of the same, which was not able alone to
accomplish the desired outcome of enhanced ability for
implementing decisions.
The emphasis on values and values analysis has continued,
nevertheless. In 1986, the American Association of
Colleges of Nursing conducted a national study using
regional hearings and working groups to identify the
essentials of college and university education for nursing.
The study addressed the characteristics of the nurse as an
educated, professional person. Essential values, attitudes
and personal qualities were specified as necessary
dimensions of the nurse as professional person. Values
were defined as "beliefs or ideals to which an individual
is committed and which guide behavior" (American
Association of Colleges of Nursing, 1986, p. 9). Seven
values were presented: altruism, esthetics, equality,
freedom, human dignity, justice and truth. The values were
briefly defined, and attitudes and personal qualities
related to each of the values were identified. The final
report is a synthesis of the responses of the working
groups, which specified further the professional behaviours
that would be reflective of the values. For example, the
value justice is defined as upholding moral and legal
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principles. Examples of attitudes and personal qualities
related to justice are courage, integrity, morality, and
objectivity. The examples of professional behaviours that
reflect commitment to justice are identified as: acts as
a healthcare advocate, allocates resources fairly, reports
incompetent, unethical, and illegal practice objectively
and factually. The attitudes, personal qualities, and
professional behaviours related to the other six values
identified as essential for the professional nurse are
presented in Appendix I.
As with the Rodmell model, these statements of the American
Association of Colleges of Nursing (AACN) and similar
efforts can serve as guides for professional nurse
preparation and evaluation in practice. Both analyses
contribute to identification of attributes of character,
attitudes and personal qualities. As aspects that direct
attention to virtues and an ethics of virtue they are given
further attention as fruitful components of a framework to
strengthen agency as a dimension of nursing ethics. Virtue
is discussed in a later section as knowledge, character,
and self-determination (Carr, 1991) in relation to
commitive and creative moral agency.
Because a practice involves standards of excellence and
adherence to rules, the values that contribute to their
achievement have a continuing emphasis in professional and
organisational practice. However, in practice organisations
value is fragmented to five fundamental types as described
by Nagel (1979). These include: obligations to other
people or institutions, constraints on action deriving from
general rights everyone has, utility aspects, perfectionist
ends, and commitment to one's own projects or undertakings.
These factors need to be part of the nurse's understanding
of threats to one's agency, that is, to enact choices.
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Although the nurse moral agent may be equipped with a
concept of value which includes the element of choice and
guiding action as discussed above (Kieffer, 1979), and may
know these values, and weigh and state them in articulated
principles; when confronted with these and other basic
conflicts, the nurse may fail to enact the reflective
behaviours in practice. The character state of the moral
agent is based in virtues and related to practical
intellect and choice (Sherman, 1991). Nursing literature
is largely devoid of dialogue on virtues as a part of the
nature of person that contributes to the ideal of actuating
the held values. This topic is given part of Chapter Four.
The effects of the lack of emphasis on virtues in
conjunction with values in nursing education may well be
operative in a national study conducted in the United
States by Cassells and Redman (1989). Students' preparation
to be moral agents in clinical practice was evaluated using
eleven skills steps considered in ethical decision-making.
Ethical theories, group discussions of ethical issues,
role-taking, and practice in making decisions were included
as important areas of instruction in baccalaureate
curricula. The findings demonstrated progress in
incorporation of ethics content and students' perceived
level of decision making skills, when compared to surveys
of prior years. However, students' estimated their
abilities to use ethical frameworks or models and to apply
consciously ethical theories and principles in practice as
"moderate", showing less progress in this area. The
authors suggested this could simply reflect constraints in
the students' practice environments, which do not make it
possible for them to resolve the ethical issues they
identify, and that certain elements of instruction in
ethics might be improved. But some of these environmental
conditions and constraints are also the situation of nurses
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in practice institutions after student status. The
influence of constraints in the practice environment is
certainly a factor that affects agency and will be
discussed further below. The significance of the thesis
proposed here is that the qualities and virtues related to
use and enactment are components of ethics instruction and
practice implementation. They have lacked explication and
require improved attention for effective nursing education
for practice.
Standards and Codes of Nursing Practice
Concurrent with developments in nursing ethics in nursing
education, nursing ethics standards or principles
reflecting components of moral and ethical practice were
written into codes of practice for the profession in
various countries throughout the world (International
Council of Nurses, 1973; American Nurses Association, 1976,
1985; United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing,
Midwifery, and Health Visiting, 1983, 1984, 1992).
Examiners included content on bioethical decision making
in tests for licensure and dimensions of expected moral-
ethical characteristics were formalised by legislation
governing nursing practice. These codes and practice laws
are part of nurses' educational and practice preparation.
The concepts and principles they include are part of the
assessment and evaluation of rule- and principle-based
decision making as well as rule-bending and -breaking
(Hutchinson, 1990 & Munhall, 1990).
Rule-bending and -breaking have many different levels of
violations and significance. In addition, the bending or
breaking of rules usually involves conflicting or
fragmented values as described by Nagel (1979). A case
scenario involved a nurse on the evening shift who
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permitted the husband of a patient to stay beyond visiting
hours because of worthwhile reasons for both the patient
and her husband. Leaving after visiting hours and when
security had been reduced, the husband was attacked and
robbed going to his car while the patient watched from the
window in her eleventh floor room. Although this situation
had harsh conseguences from a decision based on patient and
family interest, and may have been avoided by exercising
the virtue of prudence in reguesting a security officer to
accompany the visitor, it conveys an iceberg tip of many
larger issues and challenges to informed agency in
practice. While the literature acknowledges institutional
problems in the practice of moral and ethical nursing, the
dimensions of personal moral agency in response to practice
challenges in implementation of the codes need to be
explored further. Qualitative studies of self-narrative,
development of cases and ethical analyses can provide
assistance in this area of practice.
The professional bodies, such as the United Kingdom Central
Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting, as well
as the Nursing Policy Committee, Standards and Ethics
Subcommittees of the Royal College of Nurses of the United
Kingdom, and Practice Standards Review Committees of the
individual State Boards of Nursing in the United States,
are applying the codes of practice to determine nurse's
right to retain license to practice when charged with
claims of code or practice law infractions. The types of
problems encountered can provide areas for study of
variables related to actuation of moral agency. This
assists the profession to think through major ethical
issues and to provide improved education for moral agency
along with guidelines for practice.
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Nursing Research in Ethics
Nurses have acquired doctoral degrees in moral philosophy
and through other means of specialised preparation are
undertaking and directing research that focuses on ethics
issues in nursing practice. Research has been directed to
development of tools for measurement of moral judgement in
nursing dilemmas (Crisham, 1980); measurement of moral
reasoning (Mustapha & Seybert, 1989); decision-making
skills assessment (Sachs & Verran, 1990); and moral
answerability (Sachs & Verran, 1990). Methodological
issues in measurement of moral reasoning and ethical
practice have been addressed by Ketefian (1989). Sigma
Theta Tau International has acknowledged the importance of
research in nursing ethics by funding studies of ethical
dilemmas in nursing, ethical decision making in
occupational settings, perceptions of moral conflict in
practice, measurement of moral answerability, and the
elderly's perceptions of the ethics of treatment decisions
(Sachs & Verran, 1990).
As nurses have become better educated, more vocal and
active in ethical analysis and decision making, they are
increasingly serving as equal and active members of ethics
committees in the workplace (Murphy, 1989), which presents
new challenges related to consensus and its significance
to moral agency (Jennings, 1991; Tong, 1991; St Hope,
1989). This issue will be addressed in Chapter Four. As
with international similarities of ethical issues in
nursing research (Davis, 1990), one may conjecture that the
ethical issues confronting moral agents in nursing practice
have international similarities arising from the nature of
the patient, the nature of nursing practice, and its
relation to other professionals and practice organisations.
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What is still to be addressed by nursing researchers are
issues arising from within the person as professional nurse
in confrontation of self identity, character, and virtues
that contribute to the formation or deformation of
commitive and creative moral agency in nursing practice.
In summary, from this overview of the literature, from
experiences in the implementation of ethics in the
curriculum in higher education and based on assessment of
continuing education offerings in nursing ethics, it is
evident that the nursing profession has progressed in
nursing ethics education, practice, research, and in the
monitoring of moral practice. There are, however,
dimensions of nursing ethics that have been neglected and
challenge further development. One set of interrelated
problems has been the focus on medical rather than nursing
issues and on values and values clarification, which are
insufficiently related to moral principles and lack
application to situations and conditions of practice.
These conditions have an impact on patient care and have
been attributed variously to dominance of other
professions, economics-driven health care delivery, and
organisationally controlled environments of nursing care
delivery. The effect is moral distress (Wilkinson, 1988 &
Huchinson, 1990) and constraints upon nurses' efforts to
actualise morally-reasoned ethical decisions. A factor
contributing to the constraint is underdevelopment in
nursing ethics education of the nature and role of virtues
in relation to knowledge, character and self determination
for actuation of moral agency. The importance of the
virtues becomes increasingly apparent as nurses attempt to
act in morally and ethically responsible ways under
restrictive rules.
A second dimension of the problem is the still unexamined
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nature of nursing as a practice due to the pervasive
equating of the nursing process with the practice of
nursing. McFarlane and Castledine (1982) gave an early-
indication of this difficulty by deriving a set of
statements addressing the complexity of the nature and
characteristics of nursing practice. Since the moral
practice of nursing takes place within the context of
nursing practice, further attention needs to be given to
practice as a concept, and to the elements of a philosophy
and theory of praxis (Macmurray, 1978; Wojtyla, 1979, 1981;
Moya, 1980) .
A third problem is that while it is inherent in every
statement of philosophy of nursing education and practice
that beliefs about the nature of man and patient be
included, the nursing literature remains sparse of indepth
study and dialogue on the different ontologies which
underlie the belief statements. Conflictual components are
included in the philosophy statements (Johnson, 1990),
resulting in superficial, confused and failed attempts to
form a coherent, consistent foundation for curricular and
practice decisions.
This situation is made more acute because in recent years
major challenges have resulted from shifts in the paradigms
of the philosophy of science and epistemology. These are
regarded as revealing incommensurable, mutually
incompatible presuppositions and irreconcilable ways of
knowing. It is claimed that the objective rationalistic
way of knowing cannot be separated from the subjectivity
of the knower. The deontological approach and the Kantian
project are increasingly difficult to defend in the view
of the challenges to rationality. Received knowledge is
not the reality of the learner until it is given subjective
or personal meaning within a tradition and cultural
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perspective and interpretation in self-narrative. The
nursing profession will need to respond to ideas of human
knowing and valuing as other than logical system. The
initial response to this challenge has been termed
"curriculum revolution" in nursing (National League for
Nursing, 1989) .
Kim (1993) notes that there is a growing sentiment in the
nursing scientific community for the position of
philosophical and methodological pluralism. Kim proposes
alternative linkages among philosophy, theory and method
appropriate for nursing science. At the same time, she
acknowledges that pluralism in these dimensions and levels
of nursing science presents problems of choice to nurses
in practice who are concerned with knowledge utilisation.
This situation maintains also for moral theory and
practice.
Barden (1990) has proposed that indeed there are no given
or innate propositions, and that our traditions do place
us in different and sometimes incompatible horizons. He
maintains, however, that these varied traditions with their
irreconcilable basic presuppositions are themselves not
ultimate. He argues that what is common and ultimate is a
set of operations that gives rise to a practice tradition,
and that consequently we are not irredeemably confined
within the limits of our present selves.
In our moral ethical practice, we do not usually attempt
to convince or change another in unimportant ways.
According to Barden, we do not in principle accept the
other as confined within some horizon, or as playing a
language game of which we cannot know the rules, nor as
unremediably bounded by paradigms of presuppositions.
Neither do we experience ourselves as intellectually
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committed to a set of invulnerable propositions from which
we may confidently deduce our world and for which we are
not responsible.
Rather, within our traditions we discover ourselves, where
and what our bases are and learn as with earlier
generations, that these bases are open to question.
Through questioning and decisions we become responsible
that, and in what way, the tradition survives. Barden
maintains that this is true even if we exercise this
responsibility in a world or situation which is: a)
decided by other, b) the unintended consequences of
intended actions, or c) the product of the play of nature,
or our own selves, or providence.
In Barden's view, the unquestionable given is not a set of
propositions but the process or operations of questioning
practice. He proposes that the radical(root) responsibility
of the ethical actor is discovered in the agent's asking
"What am I to do Now?" And this questioning is done from
within the agent's tradition which is itself open to
question. The moral or ethical field may be defined as the
domain of deliberation and choice. "Ethical [emphasis
added] action has to do with realising a possibility over
which one has control and for which one is responsible"
(p. 7). This is distinct from moral dimensions of practice
which follow codes clearly within limits of responsibility;
acts the moral agent may have come to do by habit. One
moves from habit to act as virtue by asking the "What am
I to do Now" question, giving the answer, and acting in
accord with the answer. Assistance with the development
of this aspect of moral agency may be forthcoming in Fry's
(in progress) research on the notion and measurement of
answerabi1ity.
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The intellectual and sensitive learning of discriminations
in nursing education and practice suggests to us our
vulnerable criteria, and in this learning process we can
posit an ethic of duty or obedience to moral rules. But
more deeply, we can discover an ethic of responsible
intervention and creativity. All ethical activity is an
attempt to create from within the tradition, the particular
situation, and our personal self identity. In doing so we
are taking responsibility for the reasonable creation, in
the present, of a future that is part of a vision of a
preferred future for nursing practice and responsibility.
In order to focus on the issues, concepts related to these
developments and challenges, the following questions will
function as cues and guides for the presentation to follow
and for the reader's pursuits beyond this thesis.
Questions for Focus and Exploration
The study questions raised by the problems and issues
confronting the nurse as moral agent and how educators can
best prepare for commitive and creative moral and ethical
practice include:
1. In what ways does knowledge of the nature of the
person facilitate the reflective nurse as moral agent
to actualise that agency in practice situations?
2. What internal qualities maintain to inform and move
or inhibit the moral agent in actuation of practice
choices and creative responses to practice challenges?
3. What is the structure of a process-oriented framework
of knowlege, concepts, and skills needed for
educational preparation for actuation of moral agency?
In the following chapter the nature of the person yields
deeper insights into the being of the responsible agent.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ONTOLOGY OF PERSON AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
The nature of the person and of personal identity are
central to the daily practice of professional nurses.
This understanding is necessary in order to be duly
respectful in our attention and care of persons, and to
confront the moral and ethical challenges presented by
contemporary and future socioeconomic and technological
demands on practice. The perspectives and research
findings of the various disciplines give only their
respective limited views of the nature of the human
being. Efforts toward synthesis of the sciences will not
yield the basic understanding and insights needed to
respond appropriately as individuals, nor as a
profession, to the needs of the persons for whom we are
committed to care. The purpose of the following
discussion is to differentiate approaches and concepts of
person as foundational to understanding intra- and inter¬
personal aspects of practice. Personal or self identity
is a dimension of person which is given separate
attention in this chapter as an essential element in the
actuation of moral agency.
Since person is a metaphysical concept, there are
difficulties in adeguately presenting ideas due, in part,
to language that is abstract. It is influenced also by
ongoing dialogue and debate regarding explications of
words which can acguire different meanings in a
particular model or approach. The purpose is to describe
the basic knowledge to be gained in ontological approachs
to understanding the nature of person in relation to the
27
larger purpose of the thesis, which is to relate the
nature of personal identity to the actuation of moral
agency.
Approaches to the Study of Person
Based on analyses of a number of theories of person and
personal identity, McCall (1990) concluded that the
meaning of the terms person, self, and human being can be
distinguished as representing different modes of
conceptualising the individual. For others, the term
'individual' is limited to mean that which differentiates
one material substance or being from another. McCall
views the individual as the subject of all the properties
which constitute the concepts person, self, and human
being taken conjointly. She states
The concept of person [emphasis added] represents an
understanding of individuals, who display
psychological characteristics, are capable of
second-order reflection and volition, and so forth.
(P. 178)
McCall acknowledges that this is a public understanding
of individuals as persons, and that from the public
perspective there are properties that may be attributed
to or occasionally denied to the individual by others. An
example, might be a person with compromised mental
capacity being declared incompetent to stand trial or to
make informed health decisions. The concept of self
represents the experiential nature of an individual as a
self-conscious entity, as subject of his or her actions,
thoughts, memories or intentions. These experiences
cannot be identified apart from the individual who has
the experiences. Understanding individuals as biological
entities that demonstrate specific patterns of growth and
maturation, and other species-determined changes is
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these concepts do not place the individual person as
essentially in relation to other.
Nursing studies have tended to focus on the individual
represented in McCall's concept of human being, using
selective rather than systematic, integrated approaches
to self and person representations. While we may fully
acknowledge that there may be different ways of
understanding or of perceiving the individual, the
concept of person in this thesis is explored to identify
depictions of this entity as an interrelated unity. The
analyses of authors who have attempted to study the
person without presupposition and from non-reductionist
approaches are described in the following section.
Weiss (1983) maintains that the study of this entity, man
(human being) and person, is affected by an intellectual
world that has placed considerable emphasis on attempts
to understand the familiar, experienced, and complex, in
simpler, more precisely-characterised units. When these
units or components are regarded as alone real, that is,
as necessary sources or predecessors of the complex
entity, the result is reductionism. Weiss rejects five
current forms of reductionism that operate in this way in
the study of man and person: physical, technological,
biological, psychological, and linguistic. His rejection
of these reductions is based in part on the fact that
each form uses data, observations and confirmations of
the area it presumably replaces, and yet each form is
offered as a truth for the others to accept as truth. He
claims also that more is already known than any
reductionism allows. For example, we know that "men live
their bodies to realise prospects not within their
purview and outside the reach of physics, technology
biology, psychology or language" (Weiss, 1983, p. 6).
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Weiss' began his nonreductionistic approach to person,
using the concept of "privacy" as the root of human
agency. He uses common sense, experientially validated
speculation (with the experience of pain as the point of
departure), to present the positive description of the
multiform appearances of privacy as evidenced in human
activities.
In addition to Weiss' metaphysical analysis, the second
approach to the analysis of person has been selected as
beginning in a phenomenological study of the person as
the other. This has special importance for nursing
practice since it deals with how we may attain to
intersubjective experience or knowledge of the other.
Stein (1989a), a student of psychology and of Husserl,
used the framework of phenomenology to attain to an
ontological foundation of psychology and the human
sciences which are so basic to nursing science and
practice. Through processes of discrimination, she
demonstrated the nature of empathy as a sui generis act
and experience of "foreign consciousness", that is, of
the person as a consciousness that is not my own.
Empathy is demonstrated to be the basis of
intersubjective experience and becomes the condition for
knowledge of the constitution of the psycho-physical
individual and spiritual person, as well as of our own
person.
These approaches are selected from among other
representations as more contemporaneous, because two
basic understandings of person are evident, and their
exposition of the nature of person includes approaches to
development of the person. One categorises person as a
type of being relative to other types of beings; it holds
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the person to be an individual and rational substance.
The other approach sees person in relation at some level
to an other and others. The former approach attempts to
refine the definition of person and to categorise person
as a type of object, a "what". The latter reveals in the
concept of person in relation to other, the basis for
'appreciating' or experiencing the distinctions of one's
superficial self or individuality, of one's deeper self
or person, and of one's true self or identity as grounded
ultimately in God and to be realised in one's person. A
person with this insight might articulate as his or her
basis for agency the position that "persons originate in
God, are called into being by Him and are called into
union with Him". Person in this sense is the ground of
each human being's theological identity as well as
personal and self identity.
In the following sections, the examples of these
approaches are presented in more detail as positions that
may be representative of and useful to numbers of
professional nurses seeking a way to articulate their
foundational positions vis-a-vis their agency as persons
as well as that of patients as persons. Weiss' (1983)
analysis of the person as the interplay of the
ontological pair--finalities (powers or modes of being)
and actualities (individual privacies)--is an example of
the first approach. The relational approach to the
nature of person is represented by the work of Stein
(1989a; 1989b). These analyses will be explored in some
detail as providing a way to address what Charles Taylor
(1989) has identified as a specific difficulty for
personal self identity in modern times--the loss of
language adeguate to express the dimensions and identity
of the person, especially the spiritual dimension.
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Weiss on Human Privacy and Personal Identity
Man, like every other actuality or spatio-temporal
individual, is part of the reality and also stands
outside it, and functions at both places in ways no other
actualities do or can as an individual privacy. Weiss
states
' Privacy'[emphasis added] will be used ... to refer
to the initial source of a man's activities. What
he initiates may not be given a bodily expression.
It may make a difference to the body's functioning.
Or it may bear on what is outside the body. (p. xi)
Two essential aspects of Weiss' concept of privacy are
that privacy is the root of human agency and that it is
able to act independently of the body. Weiss does not
offer these claims in support of a theory of an
immaterial soul, in spite of the similarity with that
idea. The idea of an "inner" agency able to act
independently of the body is presupposed not on any
religious grounds, but because it is implied by our
ordinary self-understanding. Weiss' project, taking as
its point of departure the personal experience of pain,
is the philosophical defence of what can be known of
human nature by common sense. The structure of his
argument moves from non-controversial to higher levels of
discourse where the same beliefs become not only
controversial but rejected in some schools of thought.
Human privacy, as the initial source of a man's
activities, and its evidences or epitomisations are known
by observation and introspection. The term
'epitomisations' is used to express the multiple ways in
which human beings achieve determination by insistence of
their being in opposition to or in conjunction with other
individuals. Inherent in one's own privacy, from its
earliest zygote stage, is a promissory form to be
actualised, and attempts are made to achieve that
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potential or epitomisation. In ordinary common sense,
reliable judgements are made about the "inner states",
certain motivations and ideas, and the ability to act.
Systemic inquiry makes evident the presence of certain
powers or evidences of human privacy.
Epitomisations of Human Privacy: The Person, The Self,
The Idios
Human privacy and its epitomisations underlie and make
possible the ways human beings "express themselves in and
through their bodies"; ways like sensitivity, desire, and
so forth. Weiss writes
Epitomizations are a consequence of an effort to act
with greater definiteness and efficacy--an effort
which is in itself a specialization of a man's
primal attempt to complete himself. In the absence
of all epitomizations, he would have only an
indeterminate privacy acting on his body. (p. 47)
The primary concern in this thesis is with what Weiss
terms the epitomisations of the self, the expressions or
manifestations of the self, especially the I, which is
said to be the locus of self identity. The self is an
expression of the person, rooted in the individual
privacy. A further, deeper (or higher) epitomisation of
a privacy is the idios, which functions to harmonise and
maximise the operations of the other epitomisations of
person and self. Thus, the idios operates to improve or
perfect rather than complete itself. Evidences of the
idios--the inward self-sufficient, self-mastered, self-
guided, creative and self-established human being--are
developed by insistence of the privacy to achieve its
possibilities or epitomisations as a person and self.
By accepting whatever conditions everything else,
the idios becomes enriched, and attains a position
where it can enrich and reconcile other
epitomizations of the privacy with one another. To
do this it makes use of all the finalities [powers
or modes of being, explanation added], under the
limitations which those epitomizations impose. The
finalities are present and operative apart from the
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idios; they act on and are countered by whatever
actualities there be. The use of the finalities by
the idios is an additional fact, dependent on the
existence of a mature man. (Weiss, 1983, p.250)
The interplay between the idios, harmonising and
maximising the operations of epitomisations of the person
and self, and the finalities, that is, the powers or
modes of being, is a maturational interaction. The idios
concerns not so much existing as existing excellently.
Expressing the self from this more unitary position, the
mature human being subjects whatever he or she encounters
to him or her self by a constant presence, source,
possessor, and control. The idios effects this balance
and overcoming of conflicts or incompatibilities of
epitomisations to exist excellently by providing
appropriate remedies and cures.
Nine types of remedies may be used as appropriate, which
at given times successfully reduce a particular conflict
and rectify situations or unwanted outcomes. The primary
meaning of 'remedy' is the desirable reduction of an
undesirable occurence. The remedies include: denial of
opportunity, denial of satisfaction, constraints,
threats, habituations, interspersals, counteractions,
transformations, and destruction. True remedies
function to awaken internal productions of more
encompassing corrections than could be provided from
without to rectify situations.
A case example of transformation as a remedy is provided
in a story by Shideler (1985). A nun was vowed to the
care of poor children but obsessed with the desire to
travel. By an act of acceptance she converted the
prospect of travel into retrospect, treating the children
that day with fresh energy and new recognitions as one
just home from a long journey.
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Actually, this example approaches the characteristics of
a cure. Weiss describes a cure as producing the wanted,
rather than simply excluding the unwanted. Cures produce
a proper functioning, making remedies unnecessary. For
example, one undergoing surgery wants an operation to
correct the underlying defect or enable freedom of
movement, rather than the mere reduction of pain. The
idios is at work here, seeking the selection of
approaches to development of the person in order to exist
excellently. A full cure enables control and adjustments
so that the one's acts maximally exhibit the nature of
the unitary source. Cure and will act together for the
achievement of health and well being.
Each is a unique privacy with one's own epitomisations of
this excellence, in one's own expressions and lived body.
The privacy of the matured being has developed, according
to Weiss, from its initial existence as a particular,
individual eruption, evanescence, or condensation of the
dunamis. The privacy is an irreducible unit or
actuality, an atomic monad or fragmentation of dunamis.
The dunamis is potentiality, a power dynamic, which Weiss
(1986) casts as more than the Thomistic concept of
potentiality; closer to Plato's receptacle, with the
added notion of Aristotelian prime matter. In a proper
or specific time, from the dunamis the privacy emerges.
Privacy is conceived as a relatively indeterminate
ground, that can be specialised in the various
epitomisations. Though that privacy is said to remain
"self-same" throughout the course of a man's or woman's
life, the "area of its indeterminancy is narrowed" (p.
15) over time by its various epi tomisations and their
harmonisation by the idios moving to the person's
excellence of being. The determinations which specify
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privacy are its epitomisations. Epitomisations are the
source of such expressions as sensitivity, resolution and
mind. This concept is described further in the following
section.
Privacy and private powers are necessary to any
intelligible account of human nature and action according
to Weiss. He maintains that the private control one
exercises stands athwart our attempts to understand him
or her solely in terms of genes, brains, behaviour,
language, or other efforts to treat him as though he were
wholly public, that is, in a reductionistic way.
Such endeavors are self-annihilating, presupposing
as they do the presence and activity of complex
unified men who privately formulate the theories,
cling to them, and urge their acceptance by others
who are also exercising their privacies in acts of
thinking and deciding. (Weiss, 1976,p. 13)
The treatment of man as "Broca's brain" (Sagan, 1979) or
as neural networks is a major reductionistic project. The
crux of Weiss's argument against such projects might be
interpreted as the claim that the distinction between
public and private is composed of relative terms. The
relativity of these terms demands that they not be used
in isolation since their meaning would thereby be lost.
In one way, when we theorise about human nature a
distance is implied between ourselves as knowers and the
object as publicly observable. In another way, publicly
observable phenomena need to be related to their private
sources to avoid their misconception even as public. In
both cases the explanation reguires the meaningfulness of
both terms. The attempted replacement of activities like
discussion or appreciation, which in their common sense
interpretation have an inner and outer component, with
their wholly public, observable aspects is intelligible
only on the grounds of the acceptance of the private
aspect of things. This term or end of the relative
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distinction provides the intelligibility of the claim
that the distinction is empty. Consequently, these
reductionist claims and eliminative theories seem to be
fundamentally flawed. A dynamic by which these
observations and interpretations of the inner components
may be appreciated is described in Stein's (1989a)
analysis of empathy which is discussed below.
What is public serves as evidence for what is private in
Weiss' theory. The public expression of privacy is
caught up in a public world understood in universal
objective terms. The public expression is continuous
with that privacy as it is an induplicable and unitary
insistence according to Weiss' further definition
A man's constant, indeterminate privacy is unitary,
intensive, and controlling. Insistent and effective,
it cannot be properly attributed to or identified
with a passive manner, or even a body, dynamic and
living. Much of what he privately initiates is
considerably transformed when it is expressed in and
through his body. And what he bodily does has
repercussions on what he privately is and how he
privately functions, (p. 16)
Two major theses emerge in Weiss's theory of human
privacy: that there is a metaphysical reality which
grounds the possibility of various characteristic human
expressions, and that the specifically human realities
cannot be made intelligible without admitting both terms
of the private/public distinction. Weiss asserts that
appearances reveal realities and that they must have a
metaphysical source. Just as the public cannot be
understood without the private, privacy would not be
available to us without its appearance in epitomisations.
Having discussed the basic concept of Weiss' metaphysical
approach to man as privacy, manifesting finalities and
an integrating idios, the developing manifestations or
epitomisations of human privacy give further
understanding.
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The insistent privacy seems to be a source of raw agency.
The endeavors of privacy to involve itself in the world
through its body, force it to assume a more definite
form. Human privacy is initially epitomised as a person.
According to Weiss, the foetus and developing infant is
a person in promissory form from the point the privacy of
embryo is formed and twinning does not occur. The person
is the public expression of human privacy (or in
twinning, of the two privacies/persons) and from this
earliest form has (or have) rights as being in potential
for epitomisations of privacy.
Implications of this analysis can be discussed in its
application to the dialogue and debate on abortion
issues, determinations in the care of developmentally-
compromised persons, and analysis of positions regarding
those in a "persistently vegetative state". Further
distinctions in the basic understandings of a privacy as
the promissory form of the nature of the person, rather
than emotional responses to issues are a reguirement for
critical ethical thinking. While the conceptual approach
to identification of essential content is not new in
nursing education (Quinn, 1990), values analysis (Frisch,
1987) as the method to address the issues of the content
does not provide the level of reflective and critical
thinking needed for analysis of the basis for the held
value and the resulting ethical choice (Gaul, 1987). The
following elaborations of the dimensions of person will
demonstrate concepts and suggest teaching strategies for
additional applications to nursing education.
The person attempts to act more efficaciously, making
insistent foundational effort to become self-complete.
Inherent in one's own and each privacy is a promise or
promissory form to be actualised. From this earliest
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point the privacy/person is actual and in potential for
actualisation. This is not unlike Aquinas' descriptions
of potentiality and actuality. The epitomisations, which
Weiss enumerates as those which constitute the "person",
should be thought of as operative powers in acts or
achievements of person. Efforts to focus concern upon
one's own body develops sensitivity. By focusing through
one's body upon other bodies one develops sensibi1ity,
which specialises an effort to realise value. Sensibility
is a key element in the special environment a privacy
creates or requires to achieve excellence. Efforts to
achieve completion as an individual being lead to
appropriation and subordination of other corporeal
individuals, in need to absorb them wholly to oneself.
Need specialises an effort to realise a relation of
othering. In desire the other is used to transcend
oneself. Desire specialises the realisation of a
condition that enables other beings to be coordinate with
what seeks to possess and use them. It is the insistence
of our being as desirously moving outside itself to the
insistent being of the other. Attempts to centre one's
being within an environment from one's own singular
perspective effect orientation and sociality. Sociality
is living consciously amidst the multiplicity of
individual perspectives. These eight epitomizations of
the 'person' are real possibilities; genuine prospects
for the individual being.
The implications of sensibilities as the basis for value
realisation in the learner, gives educators reason for
pause since we have not given sufficient consideration to
how these sensibilites are formed and shaped by change.
The specialisation of developmental skills is the
emphasis in this agent realising frame of expression of
the person and can be used as means of assessment to
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patient as well as learner characteristics that can
influence agency.
Epitomisations of the Self: Autonomy, Responsibility and
the I
A second set of epitomisations, which constitute the
"self", are automony, responsibi1ity, and the X- These
epitomisations are achievements rather than faculties,
and are the result of certain continuing strivings of a
privacy as opposed to inherent constituents. The
epitomisations that constitute the self are higher on an
ascending scale of greater privacy and in some way seem
isolated from involvement with the body.
A person is inevitably affected by or occupied with
what is not private, modified by what is bodily
undergone and by what has been done before. One can
point to a person, hurt a person, and provide public
satisfaction for a person's rights. One cannot
point to or hurt a self. Unlike a person, a self is
wholly private. (Weiss, 1983 p. 15)
As the individual matures as person, the privacy becomes
further specialised in the form of a self. The self is
no pre-existent substance waiting to act on the body.
The self, for Weiss, is the inner circle of human
privacy. The self is the apex of a pyramid; an
achievement built upon other such achievements. His
further inguiry yields evidence of the self and self
identity in the assertion that man is self-same or even
persistent over a career, which implies that "we must
have a knowledge of ourselves which reaches beyond both
our bodies and our persons" (p. 209). The principle of
this self knowledge and self identity for Weiss is the I;
"the innermost insistent epitomisation of the self" (p.
211). The I is available in experience as evidenced in
responsible acts and sustained claims. The presence of
a self is evidenced by making evaluative judgements
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rooted in a divergence between what is done privately and
what is done bodily. These judgements are the
expressions of the I, manifest its autonomy and
responsibility, and so shed light on ethical obligation
and personal identity.
Autonomy is described as a private taking of oneself "to
be deserving of rewards or punishments for what is
publicly done" (p. 216); for actions taken on one's own.
Weiss places autonomy somewhat in opposition to
accountability. Autonomy is the private assumption of
accountability and the best evidence of it is "imbedded
in bodily acts which express an opposition to an
attributed accountability" (p. 216).
Clear implications of these concepts are evident in an
example of a former naval corpman working as a registered
nurse in an emergency room of a large metropolitan
hospital. As a corpman he acguired and used successfully
endotrachael intubation skills on a number of occasions.
In his emergency room position he had neither attributed
accountability nor authority under license or hospital
policy to perform this skill. In a life threatening
situation, a resident physician was unable in three
attempts to intubate a patient whose death was imminent.
The nurse intubated the patient and with oxygenation the
treatment proceeded and death was avoided. The
administrators thanked the nurse for saving the patient's
life but terminated his employment and submitted the
report of violation to the state board for licensing.
In other words, societies and states attribute
accountability for a variety of pragmatic and cultural
reasons to individuals who may or may not have privately
assumed that accountability. The publicly ascribed
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accountability makes them objects of rewards and
punishments. Such rewards and punishments can be
assigned without regard for responsibility. According to
Weiss, the very act of rewarding or punishing makes
someone accountable. The nurse in the situation
expressed the basis for his action in self autonomy.
Responsibi1ity "makes one worthy of praise or
condemnation for having done what is objectively right or
wrong" (p. 216). One is properly judged to be
responsible when he or she has reached a stage in which
they are reguired to produce what "finally ought to be"
(p. 184), for example the licensed practitioner adhering
to the standard or guidelines for care. Accountability
refers to an external, public tracing of actions to a
locatable body, human or animal, regardless of whether
that attribution is accurate or fair. Autonomy on the
other hand is a privately undertaken acceptance of
accountability. As such, however, it refers usually to
the same standards as accountability, that is, a
prevailing social morality. Responsibility, at a deeper
recess of the privacy, refers one to what finally ought
to be. This ultimate standard goes beyond what any
particular society may judge good or bad. A human being
then, is responsible based on his or her metaphysical
status, that is, one's achievement of a privacy
sufficiently complex and mature to enable them to allow
a final standard to become part of their actions.
Once this level has been achieved, according to Weiss,
human beings remain responsible regardless of whether
they continue to act responsibly. One may note that
Weiss's concept of responsibility seems to eliminate the
necessity of considering intention. But Weiss regards
intention as proper to the person epitomisation,
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resolution, as having to do with particularised
prospects, while responsibility is directed to a final
but indeterminate ideal, what ought to be.
The ex-corpman nurse's articulation of this as principle
to guide action may have been stated as: One who has the
reguisite skill to prevent a person's death ought not to
allow a person to die without attempting to use the
skill. Learners can be challenged to express different
articulation of the principle that would direct their
agency to act in a particular way.
Rights and Claims
Privacy is not fully determinate until death, not
completely articulated, not exhaustively epitomised; yet
it is insistent, making privacy effective in and through
my lived body. Access to my privacy is made both by
myself and others from the outside through my available
public, locatable, perceivable embodied person. Each
epitomisation has rights against other limited forms of
more basic rights: the right to be, to function, to
prosper. This latter right may give pause to an ex-
corpman nurse at risk of losing the right to be and
function and prosper in one's chosen life way. But the
nurse may still articulate the principle that if these
goods can be acquired in another way, one ought to
initiate the skill to save the person's life and may base
this in the rights and claims of the patient in an
emergency room.
All rights are lodged in, exist in the person even when
there is no public expression. As lodged in the person,
the rights have the form of native rights with justified
public expression. A just society or just state,
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protects, supports and helps men satisfy those rights.
A person is a locus of rights. Some rights originate in
and are demanded by the person and its epitomisations;
other rights maintain on behalf of the self and its
epitomisations, or of other specialisations of privacy.
Each right is a claim to be, to function, to prosper; to
have and to express a/my person, a self or an
epitomisation of either my person or my self.
Because some of the rights present in a/my person are
claims made on behalf of a/my self, or by what
specialises this self, no knowledge of what a person is
will reveal all the rights a man or woman has, even when
these are present and publicly presented by him through
the agency of his or her body or in petitions, demands or
requests. My body as lived by my person sustains the
rights. The rights of the person are a concern of the
state; rights of the self are outside the providence of
the state.
In summary, this view of inherent rights of the person,
and the unarticulated rights of the self, along with
other concepts, through fresh language and insights tends
to provide an overview of the dimensions of the human
being which is unlike the partial views of the various
sciences. Equally, it presents new questions and
challenges that need to be explored more fully in
relation to agency in nursing practice. The concepts of
man and human being are to be explicated in the
philosophy of nursing to guide curriculum and practice.
Thus, consideration of an integrated analysis of the
human being, person, and self, such as presented in
Weiss' work, can avoid complaints of inconsistency in
philosophy and curriculum and serve as key elements in a
framework to organise the wide ranging content on the
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human being. The terms can be applied differentially to
the nurse as well as the patient. The challenge to
nurses who see the value in an integrated framework is to
structure the content and processes to support and re-
enforce the dimensions of person in the curriculum.
A major objection or critigue of the objective analysis
of the 'whatness' approach is that the dimensions
described are gualitative and that direct experience does
not contain such distinctions of components of person and
necessarily remain abstractions. Examples and application
can demonstrate the meaning of the terms in practice
cases.
A second type of understanding of person can be gained
from the relational approach to analysis of the person,
and incorporated as egually important to the nurses
preparation. This approach may have more familiarity to
nursing, since the profession has introduced concepts
of intersubjectivity in relation to interpersonal
communications with the patient as an important component
in nursing practice. The increasing emphasis on the
patient as partner in health care tends to raise the
expectation of patient participation in care and health
decisions. This does not lessen the vulnerability nor
the rights of patients due to knowledge and skills
differences, nor the autonomy, accountability and
responsibility of the nurse to perceive and communicate
with persons.
Stein's View of Person as PhysioPsychoSpiritual Unity
The point of departure in Stein's (1989a) approach to
basic knowledge of the person is that we experience
another as other, and from a relational perspective she
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begins with a phenomenology of empathy as an act and
process which permits access to the other. Stein's
concern was how an other's experience and consciousness
are "given" to and understood by us. Nursing has used
the concept of empathy and studies from various
literature and sciences, to address communication and
interpersonal processes in the care of patients. Many of
the reports dealt with a skills focus and were lacking
the underpinning of careful conceptual analysis.
Currently, there are questions being raised about the
usefulness of the concept in nursing practice because of
confusion and inconsistencies in definition (Gould,
1990), application in practice (Pike, 1990) and the
measurement of empathy (Morse, et al. , 1992). At the same
time, current emphasis on the need for nurses to
appreciate and respond to multiculturalism and pluralism
are reasons for renewed interest in this approach to
understanding person.
Empathy as Act and Process
Stein (1989a) begins her study of empathy with a root
difficulty, the essence of the phenomenon of "givenness".
The source of controversies over empathy hinged on the
implied assumption that foreign subjects, that is human
beings other than oneself, and their experience are
"given" to us. While other thinkers dealt with the
circumstances of the occurrence, the effects, and the
legitimacy of the givenness. Stein sought to investigate
its essence as a basis for understanding acts of empathy.
Stein began by differentiating empathy from other acts of
givenness and representation: outer perception,
primordial (directly present or experienced) and non-
primordial (not directly present or representational
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content) givens, and other representational acts such as
memory, expectation and fantasy. Empathy shares with
these other cases of representation of experience three
levels or modalities of accomplishment: "(1) the
emergence of the experience, (2) the fulfiling
explication, and (3) the comprehensive objectification of
the explained experience" (p. 10).
Stein further differentiated empathy from the ways in
which other theories would explain our comprehension of
other "foreign" subjects and their experiences. She
refuted the theory of fusion, which held that content is
not linked with intuition; and theories of association,
both the type linking single ideas, one reproducing the
other, and the type proposing the unity of perceptual
context in which this context is always before us as a
whole.
Stein concluded that empathy deals with grasping what is
here and now; "it is a kind of perceiving" (p. 11).
Empathy posits being immediately as a perceived act and
reaches its object directly without representation. As
an experience of foreign (an other's) consciousness.
Stein writes
Empathy in our strictly defined sense as the
experience of foreign consciousness can only be the
non-primordial experience which announces a
primordial one. It is neither the primordial
experience nor the "assumed" one. (p. 14)
Thus, empathy is a sui generis, a kind of act of
perceiving. Empathy is an act which is primordial as
present experience, though non-primordial in content.
The content is an experience (a mood or feeling of the
other) which arises before me all at once and faces me as
object (Level/Modality 1). When I begin to inquire or
try to bring to clear givenness to myself the implied
tendencies observed, the content is not really an object;
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I am turned to the object (experience) of the content
(the experience, e.g., joy) and am at the subject
(person) of the content (joy) in the original subject's
(person's) place. Only after clarification is executed
successfully (Level/Modality 2) does the content
(experience, joy) again face me as an object
(Level/Modality 3).
The Psychophysical Individual Self
In this way, empathic projection mediates and gains
understanding of a manifest or sensed behaviour as the
expression of an inner condition. For the reflecting
glance to be directed toward an experience, this
experience must assume the form of a specific "cogito".
For example, to "objectify" an act of feeling one needs
to make the transition from valuing, which is the
primordial feeling of a value, to a value judgement.
There is an inner perceptual and a value deception when
secondary motives withdraw from the reflecting glance
just as if they were not yet or no longer actual. This
is the case when the subject has assumed empathic valuing
from parents or society. Acknowledging this and other
ways the process may falter, Stein demonstrated the
progress to the constitution of the psycho-physical
individual.
Empathy as the basis of intersubjective experience
becomes the condition of possible knowledge of the
existing outer world. Stein forms the beginning
structure of a cognitive-value unity in the act of the
psycho-physical individual. The I of experience is the
unity of a stream of consciousness. The phenomenon of
consciousness, that is, the turning to the "intentional
object" of which the subject (the I) is conscious in its
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stream of lived experience, is the basis for
individuality. This means that it is "itself" (I
myself) and no other, and that "selfness" is experienced
as the basis of all that is "mine". It also makes
"otherness" apparent in the type of givenness, that is,
it is other than I.
The Spiritual Person
Thus, in experiencing subjects external to us, we know
before us in our experiential world a psycho¬
physiological individual not given as a physical body but
as a sensitive, living body belonging to an I; an I that
senses, thinks, feels, and wills. It is itself the
centre of orientation of a phenomenal world, faces this
world and communicates with me. By acts of empathy we
can investigate how whatever appears to us beyond the
mere physical body, as given in outer perception, is
constituted within consciousness. For example, the soul,
as "the individual unity of the psyche" (p. 39), is a
substantial unity with attributes related to the
acuteness of our senses and the energy apparent in our
conduct, in addition to the individualisation of the
stream of consciousness. The outer perceptions of the
lived body provide access to the experiences of the I and
consciousness; to the sensing, perceiving, judging, and
willing. Stein carefully delineates the experience, as
opposed to mere knowledge, which results from application
of the empathic processes, both in understanding the
psycho-physical individual and, moving forward, in
exploration of the disclosed spiritual dimension.
Summarising Stein's view of the psycho-physical
individual, especially in relation to active and creative
being, the individual's cognitive striving and cognitive
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willing involve experiencing the value of the cognition
and joy in the realised act. An expression of the
person, the personality, is a unity based in experience
and distinguished by rational laws. Goodness, the energy
that one experiences in one's activities and readiness to
make sacrifices are conceived as personal attributes of
the soul of a spiritual subject. The personal attributes
continue to retain their own nature in the context of
their psycho-physical organisation and reveal their
special position by standing outside the order of natural
causality. "Action is always the creation of what is
not"(p.56), and is experienced as proceeding meaningfully
from the total structure of the person.
Thus, Stein's phenomenological analysis of empathy
culminates in coming to knowledge of the spirit as the
specific characteristic of person that grounds empathy,
since only the person as spirit can go beyond the self
and relate cognitively and affectively to others in the
full sense of these varying relations. The further
analysis of person as capable of theoretical acts that go
beyond the sensuous, and of affective acts that demand
spirit, focused on motivation in its manifestations as
instincts, strivings, attitudes, moods, feelings, willing
and acting. The freedom of the person in acts of will is
maintained while acknowledging the complexity of
influences of the outer and inner situation on the
decision, resolution and execution of the will act.
Determination by strongest motive and determinism on the
basis of the principle of association are untenable in
Stein's view of the acting person.
The person as a totality of qualitative particularity,
that is, individual essence, is formed from a central
core of three-fold oneness, a formation unfolded in body-
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soul-spirit. As noted above, the soul has to do with the
psychic life, that is, with constant and variable
dispositions of a subjective consciousness. As
substantial form, the soul is the principle of life and
gives essence-determination to the being as man, that is
as human being. Access to the soul is through the awake
and conscious I myself, just as the sensuous life gives
access to the body. As a result, the self can be viewed
as object, while the soul appears to the I as
substantial, having enduring characteristics, powers, or
faculties capable of and in need of development, changing
attitudes and activities.
The spirit has to do with objectif iable contents of
intentional acts, that is, with thoughts, ends, values,
and creative acts. The bearer of these acts is an
individual person with a qualitative point of view,
incarnating a unique spiritual value. This requires the
recognition of autonomy and individuality of the person
and also the recognition that every person is subject to
general laws of nature and of psychic life. It is
knowledge of these dimensions of person and related laws
that affords the basis for a limited pre-vision, the
eidetic possibilities of what can take place, not what
must or wi 11 take place. The I has progressive awareness
of spirit as having being in itself, being able to rise
above itself in personal freedom, and take up a higher
life in itself and into its spirit-activity. At this
level, the one spiritual soul, in its innermost essence,
underlies the development of all its powers. We
understand the conscious and free I as based in and under
the direction of the spirit. Free acts being the
privileged realm of person, the spirit I is the living-
spirit-person, the conscious, free I.
It should be noted that the source of these terms were
those used in the psychology and in the phenomenology of
the time. Perhaps, before the language became
unavailable to describe the experience or phenomenon
Taylor, 1989). While she was brought up in a Jewish
family. Stein was a declared atheist during her
university years. Her work was a bona fide, highly
acclaimed phenomenological study, which Max Scheler
acknowledged as influential in his subseguent works. In
the current existential and phenomenological language we
speak of the embodied spirit-person or the inspirited
person as terms for the physiopsychospiritual unity to
which Stein had reasoned.
In a later stage of her life and philosophical
development. Stein (1989b) extended her analysis of the
relational and spiritual dimensions of the person. She
used the same clear reasoning processes and determined by
these alone, that it is without loss of freedom nor of
individuality that the being of the person as three-fold
unity is perfected in the person's relation to the Triune
God.
In her study of The Woman, Stein (1989b) discerned a
psychophysical constitution that she regarded as
distinctively different from man's, both in spirit and
will. For Stein, the purpose of education for formation
in human personality is to develop powers of knowing,
enjoying, and of creative making in order to image God's
wisdom, goodness-beauty, and power. "Self-presence",
living in the innermost part of our being, is necessary
to be closest to the meaning of happenings in their wider
relationships, to be open to the demands made on the I,
and best prepared to assess their weight and significance
for the development of the attributes of the person. She
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believed the distinctiveness in the natures of women and
men required that specific and excellent education was
necessary to develop fully the powers of each.
It might be added that in Stein's later writings, the
origin of personhood is God's incommunicable experience
of Himself as imitable. The image and likeness is
extended in relation as God's incommunicabi1ity grounds
human uniqueness. This personal life does not equate
with individualism. The person's unique expression of
likeness to God is the source of freedom and dignity.
The development of this freedom is the transcendent
direction of personal realisation or actuation.
The relational concept of person as based in the relation
to the Person of God is a viable and meaningful part of
the experiential life of many individuals and has been a
major area of study. Notable examples include the
seminal writings of William James and the phenomenology
of Eugene Gendlin (Shea, 1987).
Stein thought that this inner path to God and others
opposes the isolation and lack of identity experienced by
the individual due to the effects of social machinery and
historical forces. In this she had a contemporary and in
some respects a kindred spirit in the person of the
French philosopher, Simone Weil. These effects and the
phenomena and dynamics that produce them have occupied
many writers who seek to articulate the needs of the
human person (Weil, 1955) and who work to create means to
counter these effects and re-establish the person in
dignity. This insight into person as the ground of human
identity in God is not habitual in human awareness. When
present it forms the basis for exemplary lives, many
hidden and some acknowledged, as evidenced by Ghandi and
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Mother Teresa of Calcutta, and expressed in the focus of
Simone Weil's life and writings (Winch, 1989; & Weil,
1951), These are individuals with extraordinarily
personal and self identity. The influences on the
development of identity for agency are pertinent for our
purpose and are seen as part of the content and process
of the nurse's education.
The Concept of Self Identity
Charles Taylor (1989, 1991) traces the philosophical
expression of socio-historical events and dynamics that
influence the identity and sense of self. He concludes
that these influences have rendered some of the
dimensions of person, notably the spiritual dimension,
inarticulate in our time. In order to understand the
interrelation of these concepts, Taylor's (1976; 1985)
work on the development of self identity and human agency
is discussed in the following section.
If, as proposed, the basis for speaking of an ethics of
virtue, which claims that an agent's being is prior to
his doing, lies in the nature of person possessing a self
that is sufficient to take personal responsibility; then,
the manner of the person's action must contribute to or
fulfil his being and character. In addition to the
discussion in Weiss' concept of privacy and Stein's view
of the person, there are numbers of accounts of how one
comes to be responsible (Schoeman, 1987; Reuscher, 1981)
that could contribute to an educational program.
Articulating Strong Evaluations of Self-Being
Taylor (1976) has addressed the kind of responsibility
that allows one to evaluate and shape the self, and which
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is pertinent to McCabe's (1969) view of ethics as
language. In Taylor's estimation, reflective evaluation
of desires or objects in the weak sense of gualitative
weighing of alternative preferred actions for the most
satisfaction is not the type of evaluation that shapes
the self. Rather, he maintains that the condition for
strong evaluation exists
when in non-gualitative reflection one desired
alternative is set aside ...[it is] only on grounds
of its contingent incompatibility with a more
desired alternative. (Taylor, 1976, p. 283)
When some desired end or object is evaluated in the
strong sense, it is judged to be incompatible and not
contingent with the evaluative vision of the valued
action as part of a mode of life and the kind of person
one aspires to be. Qualitative reflection, however, can
be expressed in the language of evaluative distinctions,
for example, courageous or cowardly. According to
Taylor, it is this type of evaluation that informs and,
upon articulation and action, forms the self as
responsible. Although the agent as strong evaluator
envisages alternatives defined by a qualitative
characterisation of desires as higher and lower, noble or
base, the evaluation is not "chosen" in the terms of a
radical choice because of the paradox of dichotomous
distinctions and the need for the pull of true
alternatives in choice.
Strong evaluations are articulations rather than radical
choice, in the sense that they are our attempts to
formulate what is at first undeveloped, confused or badly
formulated. "To give a certain articulation is to shape
our sense of what we desire or what we hold important in
a certain way" (Taylor, 1979, p. 295). In these attempts
to formulate what we hold important, we strive to be
faithful to a largely inarticulate sense of what is of
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decisive importance. With the whole self, one is engaged
in inspiration, evaluation, re-definition of refined
articulations, and the self-resolution essential to
identity.
An alignment with Weiss' view of epitomisations of the
self and development of the idios can be seen in Taylor's
articulations of the self in strong evaluations. The
idios integrates and harmonises from among the
distinctions and alternatives the higher and nobler,
articulates the expression or epitomisation that best
informs the self-evaluator of its non-contingent
compatibility with one's mode of being and way of life;
and forms by action the excellence of the self and self-
identity as responsible. In the example of the ex-
corpman nurse, envisaging the alternatives of acting, an
articulation of strong evaluation might be: "To allow
the person to die when I possess this skill is
dishonouralbe (being overly ambitious for my own safety)
and a wrongful violation of my nursing oath; to act to
save his life is right and honourable action for the
prepared, responsible professional nurse".
There are other arguments for the nature of the person
and personal identity, non-reductionist views of the
self, and responsibility. Haksar (1991) maintains that
we do not have to accept the irrationalism of
irreconcilable viewpoints in the relation between
objective and subjective approaches. He argues for an
indivisible self with unity of consciousness and
continuity of personal identity that gives deep unity to
our experience. Haksar gives consideration to the non-
reductionist version of extension to a cosmic self view.
In the cosmic self view, we are connected in a relevant
sense that would tend to make us care for all sentient
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beings and enable us to see ourselves in other people and
so to care for others. He suggests the implications of
this view in relation to the problem of evil and notions
of justice and desert. Haksar recommends extending the
reflective eguilibrium method to include metaphysical and
practical views in determining the fit between moral
principles and our considered moral ethical judgements in
specific cases. Goodness of fit would be determined on
the basis of criteria of consistency, coherence, and
comprehensiveness, in conjuction with James' principle of
reasonable faith.
The concept of cosmic self and cosmic self responsibility
is the view of personal identity for increasing numbers
of individuals and their implications for moral practice
and its evaluation extend globally and into outer space.
When non-congni tivism or emotivism, that is, the
assignment of value on the basis of needs, desires and
feelings, tends to dominate critical reflection the
problems addressed by the cosmic perspective tend to lack
the immediacy of other moral ethical concerns.
Persistence in the cosmic view as way or form of life
reguires moral vision and decisions on behalf of future
persons.
The critigue of this view lies in the extent to which
utilitarian and conseguentialist weighing and assignments
of value in global or universal perspectives allow one to
effectively determine "What am I to do now"? McNaughton
(1988) contends that in cultural relativism the
development of moral sensitivity to moral values is
moral virtue. It is moral virtue in the practice of
moral particularism for moral realism in search of moral
truth. A perspective such as this reguires full
expression of self identity and great strength for
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empathic appreciation of other.
The differing approaches and views of person and personal
identity have implications for moral practice and its
evaluations. Another factor to be considered is the
influence of context within which the person adopts and
develops this identity.
Influence of Modern Identity on Self Identity
Taylor (1989 & 1991) extended his analysis of the
acquisition of self-identity to define the "modern
identity" by describing its genesis and character and
demonstrating its influence on the articulation of
individual self identity. Taylor (1989) uses the term
modern identity to designate
...the ensemble of (largely unarticulated)
understandings of what it is to be a human agent:
the sense of inwardness, freedom, individuality and
being embedded in nature which are at home in the
modern West. (p. ix)
His intent is to show how our philosophical thought,
epistemology, philosophy of language--our very awareness
has been shaped by the ideals and prohibitions of this
identity. Modern understanding of the self has developed
out of earlier pictures of human identity. The aspects
of this modern understanding include: the sense of
ourselves as beings with inner depths, that we are selves
and value and affirm ordinary life, and the notion of
nature as an inner moral source.
Taylor explores the facets of what it means, within the
various strands of our modern notions, to be a human
agent, a person, and a self. He undertakes, as a
necessary part of this delineation, to demonstrate how
pictures of the good and of morality have evolved as
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inextricably intertwined with selfhood. His hope is that
by enlarging the range of legitimate moral descriptions
and bringing out richer background languages he can set
the basis of and point of the moral obligations we
acknowledge.
Taylor (1989) contends that the connections between
senses of the self and moral vision, and between identity
and the good have been obscured and we have partially
lost the proper language to articulate them.
Interestingly, this phenomenon has been reported as the
felt and studied experience of nurses in relation to the
spiritual dimension of care (Prophit, 1985, 1991; Carson,
1989; & Bradshaw, 1992). This reality is compounded by
changes in health care delivery that restrict
significantly the time that nurses have to respond to
these needs of patients and family members.
The retrieval of self identity in the spiritual dimension
reguires that we use new articulations to express the
fullness of self identity and to confront moral practice
informed by moral philosophy that tends to
focus on what it is right to do rather than on what
it is good to be, on defining the content of
obligation rather than the nature of the good life;
and . . . has no conceptual place left for a notion of
the good as the object of our love or allegiance or
... as the privileged focus of attention or will.
(Taylor, 1989, p.3)
A dimension of our moral consciousness and beliefs, which
is ignored altogether or dismissed as confused and
irrelevant, according to Taylor, becomes a kind of
background picture. As such, it is part of our spiritual
nature and predicament which lies behind some of the
moral and spiritual intuitions of our contemporaries.
Rather than the moral beliefs and consciousness, it is
their dismissal that now informs the moral intuitions.
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These moral and spiritual intuitions go far beyond issues
that have occupied our professional concern, such as
respect for others' life, well being, dignity, and
justice. In Taylor's view, they include "our sense of
what underlies our own dignity, or questions about what
makes our lives meaningful or fulfilling" (p.4). They
involve the strong evaluations described above, which
stand independent of our own desires or inclinations, and
offer standards by which these can be judged. The
potential conflict of the individual life with standards
and codes becomes apparent in Taylor's appeal not to be
described in terms of 'living a life not really
worthwhile or fulfilling', since to do so is "to condemn
me in the name of a standard, independent of my own
tastes and desires, which I ought to acknowledge" (p.4).
This is an example of what is a root, a deep, intuition:
the 'instinct' that receives its inseparable shape from
what it is that commands our respect. For example, the
human being is described as: creature of God, made in
His Image, immortal soul, emanation of divine fire,
thought in the mind of God from all eternity. The
expressions are given reality in this time to the extent
that human beings as rational agents are recognised and
afforded dignity that transcends any other being,
indicating that these characterisations are such that we
owe them respect. We deny crucial description to those
who lack the qualities deemed to "a life worth living".
A response or moral reaction to such claims or
descriptions is an ascent to an affirmation of a given
ontology of the human. Ontological accounts offer
themselves as correct articulations of our 'gut'
reactions of respect, acknowledging that there is or is
not something there to articulate. Taylor claims that we
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should treat deepest moral instincts, such as our
ineradicable sense that human life is to be respected, as
our mode of access to the world in which ontological
claims are discernible and can be rationally argued about
and sifted.
What is articulated as we make sense of our responses is
the background we assume and draw upon in any claim to
Tightness. We may be forced to spell out our valuing to
defend our responses as the "right" ones. An example of
this would be the nurse's 'making sense' of their
creative heroic modes of response to challenges of basic
needs care for patient populations who are at risk, such
as patients with dementia (Norberg, 1980, 1982). This
articulation can be very difficult and controversial.
For example, the articulation of the right and good in
feeding dementia patients may not include and may not do
good or right for the larger view of socio-economic well
being (Griffin, 1988). Beyond differences in source of
appeal for one's account, for example, the theistic or
secular, articulating any particular person's account can
be subject to controversy, and this becomes part of the
burden of the responsible self.
According to Taylor, there is a great deal of "motivated
suppression" of moral ontology among contemporaries
partly because of the pluralistic nature of modern
society and the naturalist version of epistemology. If
we are to advance articulations of moral ontology, we
will need ways to educate nurses for moral thinking and
moral ethical agency.
Taylor depicts moral thinking as making discriminations
along dimensions of moral life. One axis of moral life,
respect for life, may place and give salience to freedom
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and self-control. This dimension would place high
priority on avoiding suffering, and see productive
activity and family life as central to our well-being.
This writer is convinced that the emerging realities of
modern life will result in the insistence on a concept of
well-being articulated in the broader range of its
application as political, bureaucratic and ecological
well-being (Griffin, 1988). This is an area reguiring
careful consideration, since these areas of life are in
varying degrees inseparable from health and well-being of
individuals. This viewpoint is not sufficiently reflected
in nursing curricula even though the components may be
addressed individually.
Along the axis, respect for others, the evaluations
relate to how I am going to live my life, what kind of
life is worth living, and what kind of life would fulfil
the promise implicit in my particular talents or the
demands incumbent on someone with my endowment.
The concern with dignity axis deals with commanding or
failing to command active respect of others, that is, the
attitudinal respect of those around us. This reguires
that one deal with the issue of the nature of one's
dignity in response to the guestion: "In what does my
dignity consist"? This is a very important component of
the notion of personal self identity and creative agency.
It points to the need for the kind of deep insight
discussed above.
A critigue of Taylor's development of this axis might be
the omission of the giving of due respect to others,
however, it may be adeguately developed as a component of
the respect for others axis. Taylor expresses the view
that the articulation of concern with one's dignity is no
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more avoidable than the issues of why we ought to respect
other's rights or of what makes a full, worthwhile life.
Our dignity is woven integrally into our comportment and
presentation or articulation of self, in Weiss' term,
into our epitomisations. This sense of self and dignity
is shaped from our earliest moments by our awareness that
we appear before others in public space, potentially open
to respect or contempt, pride or shame (Doi, 1966, 1977;
Morris, 1971; Williams, 1993). The relation of these
experiences and expressions of self are discussed in
Chapter Four as facilitators or inhibitors to agency and
its actuation in the form, style, and way of life.
A good test for whether an evaluation is "strong" in
Taylor's sense is whether it can be the basis for
attitudes of admiration and contempt. This estimation
would be that of the individual self in conscious
relation to his or her view of the good to be, the nature
of the good life, and the good to be done. One can
extend this view to state that at a lesser level than
this concept of good, the individual is indicating
mindless, heartless preferences of the physical self and
not those of the inspirited or spiritual person. This is
close to Aguinas' (1945) distinction of human acts and
act of man. It is the latter that marks the moral
ethical person.
Taylor's concern is to move our ethics from inarticulacy
to enhanced awareness of the factors and facets that are
actually informing and forming implicit ways of being as
well as acting. These include language, culture,
historical development, nationalism, belief, and
religion, among others. These elements have progressed
to give a distinctive modern identity, not just as
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background, but as operative in the framework of one's
being and acting.
An example of a nationalistic identity in American
culture is the value, language and moral life choices and
modes of being associated with individualism. This was
substantiated in the major multidisciplinary study
reported under the title Habits of the Heart (Bellah, et
al, 1985). Individualism and independence were found to
be negatively associated with commitment.
The call to recognition and inclusion of these elements
in the framework of self identity and agency, is a call
to a higher, fuller, deeper, more admirable basis for
incomparable links to strong evaluative choices. The
goods or ends of higher worth, which command our awe or
respect and stand independently of our own desires,
inclination or choices, function as standards by which
the desires, inclinations or choices are judged. This is
a partial remedy for the problems associated with the
non-cognitivist/emotivist approach to valuing discussed
earlier. Taylor's contribution is to identify connections
among our notions of the good, our understandings of
self, the articulations or kinds of narrative in which we
make sense of and give meaning to our life, and the
social or community aspect of agency.
In summary, what it means to be a human agent among human
agents is the important focus of an adequate preparation
of the professional nurse. The conflicts and challenges
to modern identity include: the emphasis on inwardness,
subjectivity, personal resonance, and self-realisation,
along with the loss of a publicly accessible and agreed
cosmic order of meanings. The disengaged individual in
an instrumental society contends against public and
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community ends and their associated goods and moral
standards. Taylor claims that the affirmation of
ordinary life, which is a strong sense or need to control
objectivity, and the importance that is put on avoiding
suffering, are two factors that colour the whole modern
understanding of what it is to truly respect human life,
integrity and autonomy.
In the manifestations of modernism, our epiphanies of
agency will be enacted amid a growing emphasis on
subjectivity and relativism, running concurrently with a
stronger thrust to objectivity in scientific and
technological progress. To link these dichotomous
elements (Kim, 1993) the preparation of the professional
nurse may reguire basic modes of reflection and
narrative, poetry and art, which will themselves be
changed in their reflective response and practice.
Identity as Articulating the Self Narrative
The view that an action is always an episode in a
possible history, by characters in enacted narratives is
shared by Maclntyre (1985), Hauerwas (1985) and Ricoeur
(Kemp & Rasmussen, 1989) among others. The narrative
concept of selfhood reguires that being is the subject of
the living out of a story that runs from birth to death,
is one's own and no one else's, and that one be
accountable to give an intelligible narrative of a self
differently characterised at different times and places
in the actions and experiences described. Personal
identity is "just that identity presupposed by the unity
of the character which the unity of a narrative reguires"
(p. 218). Being accountable for one's narrative selfhood
and seeking and appreciating others' account of their
stories can enhance professional identity and practice.
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In the following chapter the telos of moral agency and
the concepts of person and personal identity are carried
forward in further discussion of the internal conditions
for agency, which include the nature of virtue and the
relation of virtue to practise. The relation of virtues
and values to moral agency and the articulation of goods
internal to nursing practice are presented. The influence
of consensus and values discernment processes on
individual and corporate agency and accountability
presents new challenges in practice. Enlightened,
creative attention is urged for the moral issues of rule
subversion (Hutchinson, 1990 & Munhall, 1990),
accountability (Snowdon & Rajacich, 1993) and employment
risks to ethical decisions (Barnett, 1993).
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE RELATION OF VIRTUES AND VALUES
TO PRACTICE AND MORAL AGENCY
Dimensions of the person, self, and the I have been
identified as the ground or basis for enabling self
identity to support commitment and creativity, and as locus
of rights and claims to be exercised in autonomy and
responsibility. The central concern in the following
sections is the discussion of ways in which this identity
is enacted and effected in practice. Challenges in
practice, pluralism in moral views and growing emphasis on
consensus, suggest the need for a stronger method of
recognising and representing the values that underlie
practice. The virtues, as gualities or dispositions of
being are one means of actuation of agency in practice.
Conceptualisations of Virtue and Values
The exercise of virtue, arete, in the Greek accounts,
exhibits qualities of excellence required for a social
role, in area of social practice, or human activity.
Aristotle describes virtue as
a characteristic involving choice, and its consists
in observing the mean relative to the us, a mean which
is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of
practical wisdom would use to determine it.
(Nichomachean Ethics, 1106b35-37)
Aquinas adds to the concept of excellence and choice in
defining virtue as "a certain perfection of power" (Summa
Theoloqica, 1-11,55,1). Acting rightly is applying
practical rationality and acting in accord with human
excellences (the virtues). This generates a substantive
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account of the ideal life and modes of action that will
direct or guide to the best life. Such virtues as wisdom,
courage, temperance, industry, charity, and justice are
part of a person's living a good life as a whole. The good
as penetrated thoroughly by right makes prudence part of
a whole in which it is subordinated to morality. Prudence
is placed as both a moral and intellectual virtue.
The nature and role of the virtues is a neglected aspect
of development in ethics education in nursing. The thesis
proposed is that the virtues, as habits of being and
operative components of character, have an important role
in human agency and especially in moral ethical practice
of the moral ideals of the profession.
Virtue as Character
Palmour (1984, 1986) and Sherman (1991) address virtue from
within Aristotle's theory of ethics, focusing on virtue as
character. Sherman is particularly concerned with the
acguisition and moral habituation of virtue in the
formation of character. The integration of the different
ends of character, their refinement and assessment, and
judgement of what is the best and finest to do are the
contributions of practical reason.
Four aspects of practical reason as concerned with
character are included in Sherman's analysis: moral
perception, choice-making, collaboration, and development
of these capacities within moral education. Since "To
have character reguires the integration of different ends
and interests in a unified life over time" (p. 6), Sherman
notes that moral perception involves a range of
deliberations which are more complex than the practical
syllogism.
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Deliberation may not ensue in immediate action, but be a
present or future intention to act. Choice-making will be
not simply a linear process of promoting the means to
single ends, but a process of promoting ends in light of
other ends. In this pursuit, overall fit and mutual
adjustment of ends will be as important as efficiency.
Choices of specifying the constituents of the highest good
are made by the individual virtuous agent. This requires
familiarity with the particular circumstances, that is,
recognising things of all the relevant specific types.
Ethical sensitivity is appropriately deploying ethical
concepts in relation to ethically salient perceptions.
This would be a higher level of development of the agent,
as would choices of desires, plans and actions, the 'best'
among means and ends, and promotion of ends in a way of
acting or living. An example of this kind of sensitivity
is apparent in Hall's (1986) developmental model of goals
and means values in relation to elements of consciousness
discussed later in this chapter. (See Appendix II.)
The collaborative dimension mediates the perceptual and
deliberative aspects of practical reason. Virtuous agents
conceive of their well being as including the well being
of others. They benefit each other and design together a
common good--the shared life and resources for its
promotion. The current emphasis on the promotion of health
and well-being in nursing practice and the specialty
associations for improvement of practice and practitioners
are appropriate examples of this dimension. The notion of
well-being has broader applications (Griffin, 1988) in the
practice of nurse health policy analysts and advocates, who
are concerned with legislation for socioeconomic support
and issure of wider influence on community health.
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Moral education involves the engagement of cognitive
capacities, in the shaping of desires through perception,
belief and intention. The developmental account involves
the cultivation of the perceptual and deliberative
capacities, and to a different extent and degree, in
acguiring character and in acting from character. This
process is effected and enhanced by the operations of
practical reason, pleasure, and desire. While Sherman's
application is focused on the education of the young, there
are elements in the habituation of character which can be
identified as important in applicants to the profession of
nursing and those to be strengthened in application in
later development, for example, re-forming emotional
intentionality and appreciation of desires. Intellectual
delight and discovery as a focus of higher education can
be linked to the salience of particulars. This can be an
important component in the use of literature and art in
teaching moral concepts. Seeing aright, making choices,
and critical practice, with stabilization through
repetition of acts and novelty in experience of full
actuality (Simon, 1986), are aspects of habituation that
are also essential modes of professional education.
Palmour (1986) gives practical applications for addressing
painful things and vices that limit freedom by
demonstrating the dynamics of the appropriate virtue as
remedy. This pattern is an important aspect of traditions
related education (Hays, 1994). Nurse educators can
appreciate that the nurse has a dual benefit in adopting
this virtues approach in addressing both personal painful
areas and patient care problems.
Virtue as Knowledge and Self-Determination
Even more focused on the educational implications of
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virtues, Carr (1991) defends an approach to education that
is based upon promotion of virtues. Combining the
perspectives of moral philosophy and social science, Carr
maintains that the primary role of practical reason is to
establish the basic aims of moral life. Through education
and socialization, the concern is to apply control and
restraint to negative aspects of aggression and deviance,
and to cultivate positive aspects for altruism and
benevolence as these are manifest in a complex manner in
the individual and society. Two central ideas in Carr's
presentation are that virtue may be explained largely in
terms of self-control and that all genuine virtues have the
character of other-regarding obligations. Highlighting the
latter of these notions of virtue makes a productive link
to practice applications as one deals with the skepticism
and pluralism confronting moral life. Learning moral
practice within a tradition (Maclntyre, 1985) has been a
distinct presence in the educational options of most
countries. The context and tradition are part of the moral
community (Hays, 1994). Dispute and intelligible
disagreement have the role of differentiating the real from
the counterfeit. This discriminating skill will be an
important dimension of nurse preparation. Palmour (1986)
intends the use of decision trees to assist with
development of this necessary skill and as a result build
leadership potential in the learners.
In addition to the concept of virtue as character,
discussed above, Carr addresses virtue as knowledge and
self-determination. To know the concept or form of a
virtue is to have the expression or aspect of wise or
judicial reflection; the proper exercise of reason
regarding the good is a true knowledge naturally exhibited
or expressed in the moral virtues. This knowledge is of
a better way to act.
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A later development in the concept of virtue and individual
morality is that of self-determination by a rational and
free agent developing one's self-interest while respecting
that others have the same obligation. Individual and
social contracts are engaged to extend rational self
determination. Judgement and interpretation are the result
of organisation of sensory and empirical perceptions by the
self, viewed as an agency or capacity for determining their
significance to multiple experiences. Imperatives to act
as one ought, as responsible and therefore praise- or
blame-worthy, are expressions of the rational autonomy of
the self-determined agent.
In summarisation of these components of the concept of
virtue, moral virtue is characterised as a pervasive,
unifying stance which is an integral part of a person's
fulfilment as a human being. Moral virtues either exist in
the will, are dispositions of the will, or they are moral
virtues insofar as they are dispositions of powers,
abilities, faculties controlled by the will. Virtue
influences one's being in each and every situation,
especially in moral actions with other human beings, where
it helps to promote fulfilment in a shared life.
An excellence or habit of being that allowed or caused a
thing to be performed well appears to be an essential
component of the being as moral agent. According to
Hauerwas (1985), there is little agreement on the
significance that virtues ought to have in accounts of
morality, how they should be understood, or how they are
acquired. A partial reason given for this lack of
agreement is that discussions of virtue or character
involve analysis of the nature of the self or person. He
wrote
An ethic of virtue centres on the claim that an
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agent's being is prior to his doing [emphasis
added]... what a person does or does not do depends
upon his possessing a 'self' sufficient to take
personal responsibility for his actions. (Hauerwas,
1985, p. 119)
Hauerwas suggests that the self is formed by tradition and
its correlative virtues and that this is sufficient to
interpret our behaviours truthfully. One may argue that
while the values of a particular tradition are so formed,
the self, as possessing the virtues to enact them, may be
less readily perceived and or developed in personal agency.
This highlights the basis for the earlier discussion of a
non-reductionist approach to the person and self, and the
need to specifically address this content in education and
practice.
Virtue as Inherent to Practice
Maclntyre (1985) elaborates a core concept of virtue in
three stages of logically-ordered development: the analysis
of a practice, the narrative order of a single human life
and moral tradition. The first addresses virtues as
qualities necessary to achieve the goods internal to a
practice; the second considers virtues as qualities
contributing to the whole life of the person; and the third
relates virtues to the pursuit of a good for human beings
within a social tradition which provides the conception of
the good, its elaboration and possession.
In an earlier article, which focused on patients as agents,
Maclntyre (1977) wrote that the flourishing of any form of
practice requires a shared vision of the goods internal to
that practice. This shared vision includes beliefs about
the procedures necessary to achieve these goods, and about
the allocation of roles and rights within the practice
which are necessary to sustain procedures and achieve
goods. Finally, in Maclntyre's view, there should be
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shared acceptance of the constraints necessary if the
practice is not to be subverted by the pull of those
external goods which often derive from successful practice:
power, money and fame.
The Concept of Practice
Later, Maclntyre (1985) formalised the conceptual
background of a practice to mean
...any coherent and complex form of socially
established cooperative human activity through which
goods internal to that form of activity are realized
in the course of trying to achieve those standards of
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are
systematically extended, (p. 187)
As distinct from acts performed singularly with skill
(techne), the range of practices in the sense of this
definition is wide, including arts, sciences, games and
politics. Indeed, the full range of interrelated well-
being (Griffin, 1988) may extend the goods and measure of
health care practice and value.
That a practice is distinct from acts performed singularly
with skill is a sufficiently important concept for
emphasis, because nursing practice has sometimes been
viewed precisely as the skill with which singular acts or
processes are performed. In their concern to develop
commitive and creative moral agency, professional nurse
educators and practitioners need to analyse nursing as
practice, moving from ordinary, unexamined usage of the
term to studied, conscious advancement of the essential
elements defined by Maclntyre and others.
A phenomenological description of nursing in its practical,
moral and personal sense, places nursing as an
instrumental, human science of active, collaborative agents
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improving the practice of health care maintenance and
promotion through communication (Bishop & Scudder, 1990).
Statements of the moral sense of nursing were found to be
indefinite and uncertain in the literature during the
period of shift to the cure emphasis under the medical
model of nursing practice. A return to statements of
'helpfulness' and a care emphasis were identified in
nurses' responses using a phenomenological procedure. The
personal sense of nursing is integrally related to the
moral sense and primarily concerns the relationships among
caregivers and patients. In these relationships, a
personal sense involves intersubjective presence of the
nurse as person to the whole person/patient in a structured
and purposive relationship. For example, the persons
interact in a dialogue as a 'we' for mutual planning for
care. The authors felt that the professional and moral
sense of being a nurse converge in a practice which
integrates personal and professional care.
As a further guide to the analysis of practice, Maclntyre
(1985) elaborated on the notion of goods internal to a
practice as involving those goods which can be achieved
only by engaging in some particular kind of practice. In
addition, these goods are only identified or recognised
through the experience of participating in the practice;
those lacking the relevant experience are incompetent as
judges of internal goods. Those outside the profession of
nursing cannot determine or judge the goods internal to
nursing practice. In the application of these ideas to
nursing practice, this writer can recognise as internal
goods the achievement of critical/analytical thinking
(through assessment and nursing diagnosis skills, and
research of patient outcomes of nursing interventions), and
strategic imagination (by design of nursing care
interventions, successfully negotiated and evaluated). The
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achievement of understanding of the patient as person (by
empathic acts); of existential advocacy (by caring and
articulating skills on behalf of the vulnerable patient or
victim); and of educing, eliciting health from within the
person (by inspiriting and tranformations of therapeutic
insights) are goods inherent to the practice of nursing.
Having experienced and derived these goods in practice,
this nurse educator/author can articulate them as part of
the tradition into which new nurses are socialized.
These and other goods internal to the practice are a set
of reasons for ongoing efforts to excel in the varying
dimensions of the nursing process and profession. To avoid
the practice, or fail to try to excel, is to cheat oneself
of the goods internal to nursing practice. To be denied
the opportunity to practice nursing in the form essential
to the activity, or to be required to practice under
conditions that restrict the standards of excellence
appropriate to, or definitive of, nursing practice, is to
be denied the goods internal to the practice. This is true
even though the goods externally and contingently attached
to the nursing work performed (such as salary, status, and
recognition) may be achieved. The achievement of external
goods can be attained by engaging in some other particular
kind of practice.
Goods internal to the practice are not only necessary for
furtherance of personal excellence, but also extend
systematically the society's conceptions of the ends and
goods involved in the form of practice, as noted in the
definition above. Those with advanced experience, who are
competent to judge, can specify and extend previous levels
of excellence, and articulate new standards and ends for
the practice. Further describing the nature of practice,
Maclntyre continues
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A practice involves standards of excellence and
obedience to rules as well as the achievement of
goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the
authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my
own performance as judged by them. It is to subject
my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to
the standards which currently and partially define the
practice. (p. 190)
In a practice, what determines the value and standard is
complex. The value may be related to achieving an end
(telos), and also the related notion of achieving a good
or a perfect (teleios) life. The latter is part of the
value in consideration of practice as a form of life, which
relates also to moral ideal and agency (Cua, 1978).
Prudential values, informed appreciation of the nature of
the object and objectives, are reasons for and may be used
to judge actions. A person's attachments, aims, plans; for
example, a nurse's attempts to elicit health behaviours or
transforming responses to situations, are values in
process. Our various particular ends are the values, and
these are not valuable merely because they cause, produce,
are sources of, or bring about effect; that is, because
they have utility.
Value in a basic needs account is normative, and terms such
as health may be indeterminate and difficult to measure as
specific outcomes in a utility model of value. The rights
and claims of the person give value also to much of
practice. What is right or wrong to do in the face of
rights and claims can become, in the utility model, a
weighing and trumping of values or of moral reasons over
prudential reasons. These considerations were apparent in
recent cases of separation of Siamese twins and the
required care to both patients and families. The social
and scientific communities expressed needs, rights and
claims as well, some in the form of informed desires. No
assumptions can be made about what the structure of
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informed desire will turn out to be and this may vary with
time.
Part of the values domain in dimensions of nursing practice
are those things that enhance the nurse's own well-being.
This would include, but not be limited to, the goods
internal to practice. Nurses' analysis of a theory of
value and attempts to stipulate valuing criteria are part
of the articulation of moral practice and standards.
In relation to the values domain and goods internal to
practice, it is helpful to return also to the concept of
virtue. Maclntyre (1985) links the attainment of the goods
inherent to practice with virtue. He explains
A virtue is an acguired human quality the possession
and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve
those goods which are inherent to practices and the
lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving
any such goods, (p. 191)
Inherent in the concept of a practice is that its goods can
only be achieved by obedience to rules, and the acceptance
of the authority of standards of excellence in judgement
of the adequacy of one's own performance. This obviates
a purely subjectivist and emotivist analysis of judgement,
but does not necessarily pre-empt moral creativity in the
prospective development of new principles or rules and
advancement of standards of excellence. Obedience to rules
and acceptance of the authority of standards of excellence
for the practice does require a certain kind of
relationship between those who participate in the practice,
as well as the crucial distinction between a practice and
an organisation for the performance or delivery of the
practice. Institutionally-controlled and economics-driven
delivery of care restrictions, and practice models should
be addressed through resolutions at the level of
professional associations.
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All practices, all traditions, are borne by organisations
in some form. This reality imposes a set of problems
involving the relevant form of practice and its authority
vis-a-vis the authority within the organisation.
Maclntyre (1985) states
The history of a practice in our time is generally and
characteristically embedded in and made intelligible
in terms of the larger and longer histories of a
number of traditions, (p. 221)
It is the exercise or lack of exercise of the relevant
virtues, Maclntyre claims, which sustains and strengthens
or weakens and destroys traditions. He continues
The virtues find their point and purpose not only in
sustaining those relationships necessary if the
variety of goods internal to practices are to be
achieved and not only in sustaining the form of an
individual life in which that individual may seek out
his or her good as the good of his or her whole life,
but also in sustaining those traditions which provide
both practices and individual lives with their
necessary historical context, (p. 223)
Some of the criticisms leveled against Maclntyre's concept
of virtues as inherent in a practice and of morality as
practice-based in a practice tradition include that he:
gives central place to the virtues as the criteria for
acting well rather than to general rules or abstract
principles; places the virtues as central to various
practices of one's life, as constitutive of the context of
that life; and places the practice or practices within a
tradition or set of traditions. The consequences ascribed
to these emphases are lack of the broader social context
of one's life and reduction of Maclntyre's moral theory to
widening or restrictive circles of one's standards of
rationality, which are crucial to moral deliberation and
action. (Horton & Mendus, 1994). Further, it has been
perceived that the emphasis on the goal or telos and its
personal identity component refocuses from the good for man
as linked to the nature of one's society. Maclntyre's
emphasis on the self narrative as a need and means to know
who and how I am as essential to answer "What am I to do"?;
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has been critiqued as removing the regard for the self as
essentially or ideally a decider and chooser. Taylor
(1994) raises questions for clarification of the meta-ethic
of the fact/value split in Maclntryre's work, in order to
retain the moral vision of free and rational agency.
Taylor uses the distinction of substantive notions of
ethics and procedural notions of ethics to affirm the
modern notion of freedom as rule based. Other authors have
commented on Maclntyre's mistrust of modernity and
deepening emphases on tradition.
This thesis, in the scope of included perspectives, has
attempted to avoid the critical points that Miller (1994)
raises to challenge Maclntyre's view by stating that
practices must be purposive and not self-contained. This
writer allots importance to the contexts of modernity as
external influences and to non-practitioners' evaluations
of practice in relation to aspects of its social context,
though not of the internal practice and its goods. The
later seems logically to require an educated, active,
experienced and committed member of the profession and
tradition of the practice.
The collection of criticisms with Maclntyre's own partial
response Maclntyre (1994) is an excellent resource tool
for nurse philosophers and faculty members who wish to use
this dialogue to improve understanding of positions and
issues.
Lack of the relevant intellectual virtues or the virtues
of justice, truthfulness, courage, and other such virtues,
corrupts traditions and the institutions and practices that
are the contemporary embodiments of these traditions and
which derive life from them. Indeterminant and changing
views of what constitutes a virtuous act in a particular
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circumstance and setting has raised issues of consensus in
social and institutional practice (Tong, 1991).
Virtue by Consensus
In relation to the corporate professional and institutional
challenges requiring moral creativity, and the climate of
pluralism and relativism, a theory of virtue, virtue by
consensus, proposed by Hope (1989) needs consideration.
Cognitivist and subjectivist views have implications to the
notion of moral sense and other aspects of moral
philosophy. The moral viewpoint, as the stance from which
judgements are made, is in a sense an artificial and
conventional way of looking at human behaviour, which is
adopted to make judgements by a common standard. Moral
judgement tacitly refers to a shared vantage point of
critical assessment. Hope (1989) explains
The consensus theory is that morality necessarily
implies that perception of certain kinds of good and
bad is shared: to make a moral judgement is
necessarily to judge that something does or does not
satisfy a collective taste, (p.9)
In this synthesis, the singular basis of a person's rights
is the respect that person would similarly show for the
rights of others. Any obligations, legal or informal
depend on a certain kind of fairness, as well as on
psychological conditions created by an expectation on
someone's part that someone else will act on his behalf or
blame. Moral knowledge is possible because the relevant
good can be known through pleasure; that is, what satisfies
moral "desire for fairness and justice for their own sake"
(p. 158). From a character of fair mindedness, there would
be a sympathy with one's own view of acting fairly; "the
moral purpose of acting well is to do for another what he
would himself do for another" (p. 118). In practice, this
resembles the anchoring method of determining ones likely
behaviour.
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A virtue is a good and is a contributory good. Moral
virtues contribute to moral good, can only be exercised
morally, and only those with moral virtue can be called
virtuous.
What makes a person more virtuous is greater moral
ability, that is, the ability to do what he morally
ought, from deeper insight or stronger determination.
To have moral virtue, then, means that one knows what
is morally right and will do it, if necessary, by
overcoming external obstacles and internal fears and
temptations. (Hope, 1989, p. 145)
To say someone is virtuous in Hope's vision, means that the
person has a character with which the fair-minded,
including oneself, are in sympathy. Two evidences of
worthiness are how a person actually treats others and the
sincerity of his moral beliefs. To be morally guilty, one
has to be in a way that is offensive to some real person
who expects one to act decently or be penalized.
Correspondingly, to be virtuous one has to do what is
recognisable as praiseworthy by some real person who holds
one accountable for acting fairly. "Great virtue" uses the
principle of fairness, but goes beyond fairness in
circumstances of exceptional difficulty. With reference
to heroism and creativity, (which are discussed in the
following chapter both as guide for practice and in
recognition of exemplary nurses) in such circumstances,
Hope writes
With unusual insight or determination or generosity
it [great virtue] extends a principle of fairness
where lesser virtue would not. In such cases virtue
aims at creating virtue or inspiring a sense of
justice, calling on people to make the effort to
become as decent as they can. (p. 146)
For Hope, moral knowledge and judgements of the good can
come only from desiring it and having such desire
satisfied. In making these determinations, good and bad
are not contraries except in special circumstances. He
claims that a thing can be good and bad and for the very
same quality.
If the intrinsic reason for doing what is right is to
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If the intrinsic reason for doing what is right is to
treat well and avoid abusing those who themselves
would do likewise, then the ultimate aim of morality
is to serve people who recognise each other's worth.
(Hope, 1989, p.160).
This statement conveys the kind of shift in focus and value
that resembles Casey's (1991) invitations to let go of our
"prejudices", to re-view the notions of values and virtues
derived from Christian consideration in order to recognise
the extent to which our very confused system of values
reveals the we are "pagans" in ethics, valuing "pagan"
virtues (Casey, 1991). These, he claims, are more ingrained
than we suspect and are important for our contemporary
understanding of our complicated inheritance; concluding
that, from the expressions of these virtues in literature,
we are committed to an impossible attempt to reconcile
discordant elements in the Christian view of virtues.
It could be argued that the retention, admixture or return
to pagan ideas or values is the source of incompatible
views. Increasingly, efforts to reconcile the discordant
elements are based on consensus. While Hope's statements
may seem a rather surprising view of virtue, the theory of
virtue by consensus could become potentially influential
given the difficulties related to consensus. Issues
related to the dynamics, epistemology and ethics of
consensus have accompanied the development of ethics
committees and consensus development conferences for
research and practice decisions in biomedical technologies
(Moreno, 1990; Tong, 1991). Because of the implications
for the autonomy and commitment of the moral agent, it is
important to discuss these issues affecting practice.
Consensus in Practice
Jennings (1991) calls consensus the Philoctetes of moral
philosophy; the concept, like his bow is hard to live
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without and like his wound, is hard to embrace. Consensus
has practical importance when moral decision making is
subject to bureaucratic organisation and oversight, and
theoretical interest for those who reject ethical realism
and frame ethics as a practice of discourse rather than a
body of objective knowledge. Both of these reasons for
increased importance of consensus are present in the
current paradigm shift in ethical theory and in a social
restructuring of moral practice in medical and professional
settings. This has resulted in ethical choice and agency
being embedded more than ever before in a network of
explicit rules and formal procedures.
Two common and influential ways of conceptualising moral
consensus that Jennings faults are pluralistic consensus
and overlapping consensus. Pluralistic consensus describes
"a purely procedural notion in which consensus is seen to
be that which emerges out of a process of debate and
multiple veto points by affected, self-interested parties"
(Jennings, 1991, p. 448).
The difficulties relate to the extent to which the formal
requirements are met. These include free and open debate,
by those of equal power and respect, in order to minimize
tacit consent. Another problem is the lack of any notion
of the transformation of the prior and independent outlooks
of the self-interested participants. Discourse is not the
medium through which the intentions and purposes of moral
agency and self-identity can be constituted.
The notion of virtual or overlapping consensus is "that
which is arrived at by analytically abstracting from
actually existing moral conflicts and disagreements"
(p.448) to derive an area of minimal common agreement. The
problem associated with this model is that rather than a
84
robust practice of deliberation that works through and
resolves moral conflict and disagreement, moral agents are
to abstract and bracket their differences and search for
some lowest common denominator of agreement.
Jennings (1991) maintains that
an adequate concept of consensus should not simply
seek to discover common ground, which might already
preexist, but must also strive to create common ground
anew. (p. 458)
This view of consensus requires placing moral agents in a
practice informed by a common sense of what their problems
are, and a practice that transforms the consciousness of
moral agents from particularistic self-concern into a sense
of what they have in common.
The consensus has moral authority or weight according to
the extent that the formal requirements are met. This
includes the proper setting and rules for deliberations
that are honest, factually well-informed, rule-governed
and fair. "Consensus in the strongest sense of the term
happens only when it is seen as a common good to be
created" (Jennings, 1991, p. 461). Exercising moral agency
as a member of a moral community determining the good to
be created, the nurse gains a new sense of his or her own
identity as moral agent.
Preparation of the nurse to function as moral agent in
consensus committee work would include understanding of the
distinction between consensus as product and as process
(Moreno, 1990). To understand consensus as a process
...consensus should not be thought of as a goal of
ethical deliberation but, more broadly as a condition
for successful resolution of a controversy. The
consensus itself [product] is at one from the
substantive discussion, for in order to know if
consensus has been reached the group as a whole must
step back from the discussion it has just pursued and
inspect the group process. Put another way, the
conclusion of a group's deliberation is distinct, both
logically and psychologically, from the group's
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collective awareness that it has reached a conclusion.
'Consensus' is literally the sense that the group
shares, it is the way the group perceives in common
its own interactive situation. (Moreno, 1990, p. 15)
Whether consensus is understood as a product or process,
Tong (1991) cautions that the ability to reach so called
'consensus' does not, in and of itself, transform a group
of experts into a group of "moral authorities". If
consensus is understood as a product—the agreed upon
conclusions of a group's deliberations—she reminds us to
recall that just because the conclusions are agreed upon
does not mean that they are right. This is true because
individual and group dynamics can preclude the right
information and/or true consensus. If consensus is
understood as process—the creation of a climate in which
people can deliberate together—a group of people capable
of creating their own consensus should do so rather than
simply acquiesce to the solutions of another group or
committee, since the other committee would be discussing
their ethical dilemma not as a lived experience but as a
vicarious experience. The latter situation presents
challenges beyond those which already confront empathic
understanding, and reemphasises the necessity for clearer
understanding of it dynamics and use as described in
Stein's (1986a) analysis.
Because of the trend to move in the direction of greater
deference to the authority of expertise, Tong (1991) is
concerned that decision makers are increasingly impressed
by the ability of any group to come to consensus. They are
increasingly willing to believe that they may not have what
it takes to make their own moral decisions. This is
compounded by critics who question not only the ability of
decision makers to sort through a moral dilemma, but also
their good-faith willingness to do so.
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Tong concludes that there are ample reasons to become more
clear on the nature of ethics and consensus groups as
having consultative function with educative, information-
delivery and policy-making roles. Conversely, these groups
should refuse to let themselves be used as definitive
authorities and de-emphasise their case review and
standard-setting roles.
In keeping with these conclusions, Tong recommends the
development of an ethics of persuasion, having in mind that
while we may attempt to convince some people to change
their behaviour, we may never force or compel them to do
so as this would disempower them, depriving them of their
sense of and right to autonomy. Experts may give
assistance to help 'non-experts', whose perception of the
situation is the most immediate, to perceive what they need
to perceive to make their own decisions. The professional
nurse schooled in the articulation of specific, experience-
related principles that guide personal identity evaluations
can exercise this agency as a vital contributor to the
process and product of these deliberations.
This is an important effort because Tong (1991) notes a
disturbing tendency to use a group's consensus as a
substitute for an individual's own moral deliberations and
perceptions. She examines how decision makers do make use
of experts' findings and discusses how decision makers
should make use of them The latter she considers by
raising the epistemological guestion of whether the
'experts' are really experts or merely a disparate group
of individuals assembled to satisfy the requirements of a
complex political agenda. Next, she asks whether the
authority of those who are really experts flows only from
their accumulated knowledge or also from their demonstrated
ability to achieve so-called 'consensus' under conditions
87
of uncertainty. That is, one should attempt to distinguish
whether the authority is simply epistemological or if it
is also ethical. Further, if the 'experts' have both
epistemological and ethical authority, what are the limits
of these authorities. These are regarded as crucial
guestions because if it is a problem in a political society
for citizens to proxy away their decision-making power to
experts, is it not as serious, or even a more serious
problem in an ethical community for moral agents to do the
same thing?
Tong's estimation is that often bona fide experts do
represent specific interest groups and that their factual
recommendations are not value-free. She notes that many
lament the fact that hospital ethics committees and
consensus development conferences, such as those by the
National Institutes of Health in the United States and the
Department of Health in the United Kingdom, do not place
decision makers under obligation to defer to the experts.
Under the advocacy for reliance on the collective wisdom
of these expert bodies, there is a tendency for decision
makers to increasingly move in the direction of obligating
themselves to defer to the experts' advice. Tong argues
...when it comes to the experts' distinctively ethical
advice, decision makers should not defer to it simply
because it 'belongs' to the experts. Rather decision
makers should think the experts' ethical advice
through for themselves, accepting it only if it fits
their own reasoned moral point of view. Second-hand
ethics is no substitute for first-hand ethics in a
community of equally autonomous moral agents.
[Emphasis added] (p. 415)
This is apparent in the experts dealing with factual
recommendations associated with risk, safety, and efficacy
since these are concepts in which facts and value merge.
The subjective, intimately personal factor in risk
acceptability moves the application of abstract thought to
the faces and real life situations of persons.
88
Tong asserts
Ethics is not a set of conclusions that experts pass
on to non-experts; rather, it is a set of decisions
on making tools that non- experts as well as experts
must use if they are to reach their own conclusions
about what is morally permitted, required, or
forbidden to them. We cannot blindly follow others'
truths and hope to gain knowledge to guide our lives
and choices. Morality is a personal quest, (p. 426)
In summary, the quest is to each of us, in unique
articulations of personal and professional identity in our
singular and shared lives. The views of virtues and moral
virtues, articulated in varying ways and dimensions, in
alternative theories of value and ideas of realism, call
for clarifications and detail beyond the scope of this
thesis. As stated, the perspectives and aspects presented
are intended to indicate components of a framework for the
kind of discussions and interactions which are part of the
naturalism, relativism, and pluralism in practice arenas.
The individual and group work toward the development of the
framework and its content will develop moral vision or
visions (McNaughton, 1991) to be articulated as the basis
for the actuation of agency in practice. Since this vision
is attained as a vision of shared values and shared life,
an improved method for values discernment is indicated.
Values Discernment for Individual and Corporate Agency
Because values are a source of information that connect the
human being's inner life to his or her external reality and
call for actions, they will continue to be an important
focus of concern and study in the nursing profession. The
challenge to nursing is to move beyond the existential
"now" focus of values clarification and incorporate a
developmental approach to the progressive enhancement of
commitive agency. Values reflect the world view and
maturity of the person, giving significant information
about human and spiritual growth, and indicating factors
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such as management and leadership styles. Nurse educators
who are advocates of a curriculum for professional
development, whether in initial nursing or staff/
professional development programs, will make the link of
values and virtues to actuation in practice an integral
part of progressive education for leadership.
Literature sources on the changing understandings of value
and approaches to the study of values can benefit our
efforts to respond to this challenge. Methods other than
values clarification are still largely unidentified in the
nursing literature. An example of an improved strategy is
Hall's (1976) confluent theory of values which was
developed from long term and interdisciplinary studies.
The research revealed a pattern and schema of specifically
identified values which are related to consciousness,
stages of maturity, and faith development in the person.
Specific values were found to be related to stages of
leadership development in executives and were reflected in
the management design of different administrative
frameworks (Hall, 1979; 1980).
Hall (1986) recognises the connectedness of the inner
reality, a creative energy, which continually tries to
express itself through our behaviour and action in the
world. Hall termed the creative consequences of this
action the "Genesis Effect". He states: "The Genesis
Effect is the way the human being recreates the world he
or she lives in from his or her internal images" (Hall,
1986, p.10). The process enables human, spiritual and
organisational transformation.
The Hall-Tonna Inventory of Values (1986) is a
documentation system for an individual's responses to, and
prioritizing of, values questions, to which the respondent,
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in a process of discernment, gives the final meaning of the
answers recorded. Only subsequent to the individual's
meaning assessment is there a placement of the respondent
in the cycle of maturity and assessment of what a
particular value pattern indicates, based on accumulated
information. While this is done without discussion of the
complexities of underlying theory and research findings,
one may argue that this still brings the individual to the
point of possible pressure of a change to a consensus
position. It is, however, clearly an individual's
discernment process of his or her own consciousness and
this awareness is open to further definition and personal
choice. To study values in interrelation and stages of
organisational development, a composite profile of several
individual profiles from a group of persons yields further
information to which participants give common meaning and
discern insights for transforming practice.
Data from individual value analyses of over a thousand
responses to the computerized Hall-Tonna Inventory led to
the development of a model which interrelates Four Phases
of Value Development, each in two Stages, Three Elements
in Consciousness, and Two Types of Values.
The three Elements of Consciousness are the person's world
view, the perception of self function, and human needs the
person seeks to satisfy. Progressively across the four
stages of value, the perceived world is viewed as: a
mystery over which I have no control, a problem with which
I must cope, a project in which I must participate, and a
mystery for which I/we must care. The values in each of
the two stages--goals and means--progress in relation to
each of the phases. (See Appendix II).
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Particularly noteworthy for the focus of this thesis on the
enhancement and enactment of agency is the identification
of Means Values for each of the Primary Goal Values in each
of the stages of value development. Likewise, a second
element of consciousness in Phase I is the perception of
self as existing in a hostile world, as one who struggles
to survive in an alien, oppressive, capricious environment.
As in the Doi (1977) analysis, this is a threat to the
security goal and while unnamed in the model, the Means
Values of trust and hope and their effect on agency can be
inferred from the analysis of hope discussed below in
Chapter Five. Anxiety and hope are explicitly modelled as
factors influencing choice and action. Finally, the
dialectic between the awareness and expression of personal
values and expanded skills in system awareness is a process
for education and growth in both personal and
organisational development. In addition to the recognition
of the developmental stage values and the goals and means
phases of value development in interrelation to elements
in consciousness, a key strength of the Hall Model is that
each experience involves skills, choice and formation,
which links action and vision in an expanding, wider field
of possibility. Thus, the use of this dialectic, confluent
approach to values in nursing education would: deal with
values related to goals and means, affirm the essential
place of possibility in sound hope and actuation of agency
as will be discussed below in the analyses of Godfrey
(1987) and Lynch (1965). This would give a wide range of
research-based value relations across stages of personal,
professional and organisational development and
transformation. The dynamics of moral agency and moral
creativity are presented in the following chapter as
essential to the accomplishment of this transformation.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MORAL AGENCY AND MORAL CREATIVITY
Having discussed components of development of moral
agency, primarily through self-identity of the
responsible, virtuous person, in the following section
our concern is directed to the exercise of moral agency
and the problem of moral creativity or 'pioneering' in
the actuation of moral agency. Cua (1978) reasons that
there is an interplay of two aspects of the situation in
which moral problems arise; and discusses as well the
conditions that support moral agency and those that
require moral creativity.
The situation in which the need for moral agency and
moral creativity arises may be regarded as a personal
predicament that calls for a decision with respect to a
problem. In the instance of moral agency, the situation
may be one in which a responsible agent uses principles
or rules in support of the decision. The presumptive
warrant for non-arbitrary decisions and actions is the
reason for a moral practice as an interpersonal setting
of rules and principles in a given tradition. The other
situation may be one in which the rules and principles do
not seem consistent with the situation or the desired
outcome, or do not address new or emerging aspects of the
practice. This raises the question of decisions based on
articulated principles as a possible way of setting
precedents in resolution of practical moral problems.
Creative agency in the moral rules and principles model
is manifest solely in terms of how the moral agent
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qualifies moral principles in coping with situations.
Our concern is to know the nature of creative moral
agency and the range of personal valuative acts of the
reflective moral agent. Moral ideals, images of the
human being, views of the person, and the inner life of
the moral agent are means to complement the legitimate
place given to analysis of decision principles and
principled moral judgements understood in the
conventional sense.
In order to properly appreciate moral creativity, Cua
proposes the model of the artist or painter. Three
dimensions of moral creativity, seen primarily as a
problem of the dynamics of reflective agents, are
explored using three conceptual tools which Cua calls
focal notions: a form or forms of life, ways of life,
and styles of life.
A form of life is the framework of the givens, shared
attitudes, feelings, and judgements as consensual aspects
of moral practice. The agent's or a group of agents'
system of moral beliefs and performances as they behave
in some convergent fashion and explain their judgements
and behaviours as compliant to a set of rules, describes
the notion of a way or life or a moral practice. Here,
moral creativity may be understood, in part, in terms of
the individual ways of life with a tie to a moral
practice. Style of life is meant to suggest a
distinction between individual modes of existence, which
are related to descriptive differences in content and
quality. The aesthetic analogy of the artist or painter
is introduced to convey the aspects of this
distinctiveness in the agent's life and performance as an
expression of an excellent qualitative gestalt. An
analogy to exemplify style of life is reflected in
94
McCabe's (1969) ideas of ethics as law, as love and as
language. The lover does not adopt a 'law' form of life,
that is, a set of attitudes, or rules to express her or
his marital practice. Rather, the style of this life
practice would be seeking new, creative ways to express
"I am the one who loves you" in addition to the rules of
respect and shared duties of the form and way of marital
1 i fe .
To apply these concepts to nursing practice, one observes
the direct relation of the educational preparation of the
student and the ongoing development of staff nurses,
educators and administrators in both the form of life
and the way of life. Individuals, groups or the nursing
community evidence these applications of moral practice.
The education and socialization of the learner to the
form of life in nursing practice are designed to
communicate and elicit a valuation response to the shared
attitudes, values, and skills for judgements of nursing
practice. The means to inform and demonstrate the
acguisition of the judgements and behaviours that are
part of a way of moral nursing practice life are:
comparative systems of moral decision making, and
systematic and individual differences in application of
rules and principles to case studies and clinical
practice. More distinctiveness in the modes of existence
of individual agents enters into the aspects of
qualitative differences in performance of the agent's
personalized care. Style of life expressions are
manifest by individuals in nursing as artists of a moral
practice that includes quality of presence and excellence
in the gestalt of caring.
The notions of
individual and
a way of life and style
community applications.
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of life admit of
The applications
depend on moral actuation, that is, the possibility of
inspiring moral reasoning with active, operative
properties for effectuating a body of moral commitments
within the life of the moral agent. This is the
practical and commitive character of moral dynamics,
which is the producing of change in the present states of
affairs.
Paradigmatic Individuals in Creative Moral Practice
The dimensions of moral creativity are pursued from the
reflective position of a moral agent, conducting moral
theory or moral discourse. This work is focused upon
cognitive appreciation of moral creativity, and as a
conceptual experiment in paradigmity, it excludes issues
relating to moral justification and reasoning. Cua
regards the concrete home of morality as the home of
paradigmatic individuals—the exemplary moral agents who
may be said to have successfully conducted the experiment
in paradigmity. The theme of paradigmatic individuals as
creative moral agents is developed as having a
significant import to the moral practice of ordinary
agents. These agents become committed to the actuating
force of the paradigms and the implementation of the
exemplars' articulations of the advanced, higher level of
ethical practice.
Examples of situations that challenged nurses to higher
levels of ethical practice include the paradigms of
Florence Nightingale in the Crimean war, Dorothy Dix
confronting the plight of the mentally ill, Cicely
Saunders responding to the needs of the incurable and
terminally ill, and others of noted heroism (Lanara,
1981). Each were distinctively setting the ethical aim,
practising the practical wisdom of conviction, giving
96
utterance to the expression of self identity of the "I
myself am the one who takes responsibility" (Taylor,
1976; Weiss, 1983; Ricoeur, 1990, 1992). These
individuals cannot be referred to accurately as role
models because their actions were not part of the already
existing excellent practice of a given role. Rather,
confronted with no prior role model, they responded to
extreme conditions or challenging situations in ways that
were and are paradigmatic of ethical practice in the
given situations and conditions.
Based upon a detailed analysis of exemplars, Cua (1978)
concludes the following points regarding the role of
paradigmatic individuals (PI) in moral practices
1. The Pis give an actuating significance to a moral
practice or cultural way of life. They furnish us
exemplars of intrinsic actuation of moral rules and
ideals implicit in their moral practices.
2. By their insight into the human condition, they
infuse vitality to moral rules and ideals by
embodying them in their lives and conduct.
3. By their styles of orientation to their own moral
traditions, they may become themselves points of
moral orientation or beacons of light, thus
functioning as standards of inspiration for
commitive moral agents (p.49).
A moral practice is defined as "a cultural way of life
that may be characterised as a system of rules recognised
as binding upon the conduct of a community of persons"
(Cua, 1978, p.79). From an internal point of view, a
moral practice would include both these rules and certain
sanctions for deviant behaviours. Concerning the nature
of creativity within a moral practice, Cua maintains that
the question of moral creativity deals essentially with
the material aspects, that is, the substance and content
of moral practice rather than with the formal aspects,
such as universalizabi1ity of moral judgements.
Universalizabi1ity is one of the principles taught to
97
nurses as a criterion for moral decisions, but regarded
as difficult to apply to care for a particular patient.
If we are willing to allow the view that moral
principles, in addition to being used for justification
of rules "are essentially open textured in the sense that
their application depends on the interpretations of the
agents within a given moral practice" (Cua, 1978, p. 83),
then one sees the paradox that results in the
restrictive, institutionally dominated thought and
practice that Douglas (1986) delineates and critiques.
The types of consequences of institutionally dominated
thought work against well-being in its broader dimensions
of socio-economic and environmental well-being as
addressed by Griffin (1988), and against the moral
dynamics to support the emergence and actuation of
paradigmatic agents in nursing practice.
Cua's response to this type of situation is the
distinction between minimum and maximum content of moral
principles or rules, which may help nursing educators and
practitioners to be more responsive to conditions that
challenge moral creativity. Minimum content is that
provided by the background of moral teaching. It
presupposes a common understanding of how and to what
these principles are meant to apply in practice, and the
use of examples that constitute the guiding
interpretations of moral principles. Maximum content is
described in terms of the individual's rulings which are
reconstitutive of the content of one's moral practice,
and provide changing, diverse interpretations.
This emphasises the importance of case and practice
reports, especially by advanced and paradigmatic nurse
practitioners. These reports would comprise a portfolio
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of the issues and dynamics of the practitioner's
experiences related to moral ethical agency. Specific
examples might include case reports of "insistence of
being" (Weiss, 1983), articulations of principles, and
strong evaluations (Taylor, 1979),
The relation between the moral agent and his or her moral
practice and moral creativity is further elucidated in
terms of the notion of ruling by three corresponding
attitudes and activities: moral acceptance, assurance,
and construction. The attitude of moral acceptance
refers to the degree of strength of assent to moral
rules. Moral assurance is the attitude of confirmation
of a moral practice. The constructive character of moral
agency is evoked in situations not clearly covered by
moral rules and thus calling for individual decisions.
In summary, the creative aspect of moral agency is a
constructive activity of the agent, modifying and
qualifying rules in terms of exceptions, and by extension
converting an indeterminate situation into a rule- or
principle-determinate one. The application of these
attitudes and activities in response to the challenges of
moral practice raises the question of the qualities of
character and virtues needed for creativity. Having
discussed the nature of virtues in relation to agency in
the previous chapter, the following discussion addresses
the issue of agency as influenced by barrier
characteristics using the examples of shame and guilt and
facilitator characteristics illustrated in hope and joy.
Analysis of Concepts Related to Actuation of the
Commitive Moral Agent: Barriers and Facilitators
Both external and internal elements can contribute to the
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ability of the prepared and committed moral agent to move
from potentiality to actualisation. The focus here is on
the internal aspects of the person, self and I, who must
confront the external condition. If the nursing
profession is to direct attention to preparation for
practice in naturalistic and pluralistic settings, as
well as confront the issue of the multiple commitments of
fellow practitioners, we need new levels of understanding
of the dynamics and interplay of the conditions that are
barriers to creative agency and those that facilitate or
maximise effective actuation.
The Relation of the Concepts of Shame to
Actuation of the Commitive Moral Agent
It seems a common sense understanding that shame and
guilt would militate against strong agency. Some
important distinctions can identify their differences in
source and outcomes, as well as suggest areas that can be
recognised and hopefully remedied.
Aristotle (Ostwald, Trans. 1962.) in Book Four of the
Nicomachean Ethics cites as examples of the relation
between the mean and its extremes a number of particular
virtues. In his discussion of shame he acknowledges that
it is incorrect to speak of a sense of shame as being a
virtue or excellence. He describes the effects of shame
as resembling and being more typical of emotion than of
a characteristic. However, Aristotle goes on to relate
his notion of shame as a phenomenon felt for voluntary
actions, and since no decent man will ever voluntarily do
what is base, he acknowledges that shame appears to be
conditionally good. This is a further evidence for his
ascribing non-virtue status to shame since "there is
nothing conditional about the virtues" (pp. 109-110).
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And, although the sense of shame may reflect moral
strength, that also is not virtue, but a mixed kind of
characteristic. But it also seems strange to think of the
sense of shame as related to conditions over which one has
no voluntary control. An example is the case of a young man
with a crippled foot who would always keep it covered so
as not to be seen, though the deformity was not a
consequence of his own actions. The idea of the spectator
in relation to shame is discussed below.
Interestingly, earlier in Book Four, Aristotle describes
ambition and lack of ambition as the extremes of a nameless
virtue (pp. 99-100). He places this seeming virtue within
the sphere of honor and relates it to the fact that we can
desire honor more than we should and less than we should,
and from the right source and in the right manner. As a
term of praise "ambitious" means "fonder of honor than most
people." As a term of blame it means "fonder of honor than
one ought to be." Aristotle states: "There is no name for
the mean, the extremes dispute for its possession as an
unclaimed inheritance, as it were" (p. 100). He stresses
that it must be possible to desire honor to the right
degree but acknowledges that the characteristic which
constitutes the mean in the sphere of honor is nameless.
Since the man who occupies the median position does not
have a name, the men at the extremes --ambitious and
lacking in ambition-- are only seen in their opposition to
one another. Yet, as discussed above, the idea of
honorable or dishonorable is a qualitative distinction that
can be applied in the effort to make strong evaluative
descriptions (Taylor, 1976) to inform and form one's self
identity.
In order to show the relation of the sense of shame as
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characteristic or conditional good suggesting a "sort of
virtue" to Aristotle's extremes of ambition as related to
honour but lacking a median, the purpose of this section
is to describe features of the structure and dynamics of
the conceptualisation of the sense of shame. The
relational aspects of ambition as a sphere of honour and
a proper sense of shame as being-in-place or at-homeness-
in-the-world are described through the inherent features
of personal identity and autonomous action in the
intrinsic actuation of the commitive moral agent. In
order to speak of the ethical or moral implications of
shame in contrast to guilt, the conceptualisation of
ethicality is described to provide the frame of reference
for such implications.
There are multiple references which identify ethics as
usually regarded as a discipline concerned with the
Tightness or wrongness of human deeds, institutions and
practices. Hence, Bourke (1968) describes ethics as "the
reflective study of what is good or bad in that part of
human conduct for which man has some personal
responsibility" (p. 10). The latter aspect of the
description is perhaps given greater emphasis in
Frankena1s reference to ethics as "philosophy that is
concerned with morality and its problems and judgements,
or with moral problems and judgements" (Frankena, 1973,
p. 5). This statement provides for the inclusion of
deontic judgements (of moral obligation in Kantian
imperatives) as well as aretaic judgements (of moral
value). In the elaboration of this view, Frankena
stresses that even though one may view the morality of
principles as basic, the emphasis on doing must be
balanced by placing a premium on BEING an agent with
morally good traits. That is, the agent is disposed or
tends to identify with moral ideals as ways of being
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rather than of doing. The disposition to be includes
second-order virtues such as moral courage,
conscientiousness, and the like, as covering the whole of
the moral life. Frankena adds to the disposition to be,
moral autonomy, the ability to make moral decisions, to
revise principles, and to realise the "inner lives" of
others, to the disposition to find out and respect
relevant facts, and a disposition to think clearly as
second order traits. Thus, to the sense of duty or
obligation there is added the sense of the nobility of
great moral courage and of the higher reaches of moral
idealism.
This is analogous to Kierkegaard's (1968) analysis of the
nature of ethics in a theory of three spheres or stages
which constitute a philosophy of life in the form of a
philosophy of evaluation. Essential to the nature of
ethical decision are alternatives and the demand that the
subject become infinitely interested in living and living
well or excellently. That which is significant ethically
in the host of evaluative relations occurs at the stage
or level of an existential dialectic in which passions,
commitments and interests mutually confront one another.
Ethicality is not so much a matter of searching for
conceptual truths (as in the view of ethics as a science
of correct choices between good and bad); but rather, as
Kierkegaard believed it to be, a matter of seeking to
become the truth, of translating the possibles of the
objective intellectual dialectic into concrete reality.
Ethicality transforms the subject; it is a movement
within the personality toward activating one's own
reality. To be a subject in the kind of synthesis that
means putting a life or a reality together, is to be in
the sense of effecting a synthesis within one's
personality (Holmer, 1953).
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A final view of ethics complements the above descriptions
and amplifies the individual, personal expression of this
transformation. McCabe (1969), in his analysis of ethics
as law, as love, and as language, clearly places its
greatest significance in the latter relation. Because
love is "a growing word" with developmental and differing
meanings, McCabe maintains that ethics is the study of
human behaviour as communication. Our human acts and
deeds not only get something done, i.e., have results;
but also get something said and this is just as
meaningfully significant to man as commitive moral agent.
Our acts as word or expression exist as communication
which reveals ourselves to ourselves and to others and
shapes our own identities. McCabe illustrates important
similarities between ethics and literary criticism.
First, they are similar in their purpose, which is to
enable us to enjoy and respond more sensitively, by
entering more deeply into the significance of human
action in moral life and poetry. Secondly, they are
similar in that neither comes to an end--the judgement is
always a matter of probing into the depths of work or
act, seeking a more profound understanding, greater
seriousness, more meaningful expression. Ethics, in this
view, "is the quest of less and less trivial modes of
human relatedness" (p. 99). Morals in practice, that is,
self-expression, is the attempt to live out our lives in
terms not only of the more obvious, but also of deeper
forms of communication with others.
These dimensions of ethicality and morality reaffirm the
significance of the deep self views of self identity
discussed above, and seem precisely what Cua propounds in
his interpretations of moral ideals and the role of
paradigmatic individuals in the creation and
idiosyncratic achievement of styles of life. In the
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following sections the concepts of shame, in contrast
with guilt and the concept of hope will be distinguished
as contributive to the expression of the identity and
actuation of the moral agent. These concepts were chosen
as examples that relate as barriers or facilitators to
agency.
Conceptualisations of Shame and Guilt
The structured analysis of shame and guilt by Cua (1978)
include the following areas: 1) Nature or "essence" and
relations of the concepts; 2) Circumstantial aspects; 3)
Direction; 4) Reflective aspects; 5) Evaluative standard;
and 6) Prospective or retrospective significance. In the
following discussion these aspects of structure help
relate the concepts to their implications for moral
agency.
Basic to the nature of shame in terms of the sense of
self as agent, are the related notions of an internal
monitor as well as being seen by the other as spectator.
Beck (1975) makes important distinctions between the use
of the term agent in an ontological sense meaning an
'actor', and its meaning a 'spectator' when used as a
perspectival or histrionic term. He notes that there is
a significant difference between what is permitted to a
spectator of my actions and what I as an agent may do;
and also between what an agent can say and what a
spectator can say about him. For these determinations in
the act of referring to the agent's beliefs, the agent
must know better than the spectator, for example, that it
is true or a lie; but the spectator must know more that
the agent, for example, that the agent is wrong in some
expressions. The relational nature of shame places the
agent in the position of being seen as lacking in the
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attainment of moral ideals and seeking to hide or
withdraw as his sense of self-worth and desert are
compromised. Williams (1993) agrees that the
psychological model for shame involves a watcher or
witness, but not by direct internalisation. At root,
shame involves exposue in being at a disadvantage or a
loss of power. The sense of shame in the consicousness
of the loss in a move to self protection. This sense may
be experienced in the eyes of another--the watcher, or as
an embarrassment even without another present. This
writer believes that the watcher in this latter condition
in one's own idealised self, and the sense of shame is
the loss of that watcher self. A strong sense of shame
arising from this source could be much more pervasive in
its effects on agency than shame experienced in the
"nakedness" of observed exposure of acts or self to
another. William (1993) makes an additional important
point in the statement
If we are modelling the ethical operations of shame,
we naturally do it through the internalisation of a
figure who sees the subject's failing just in virtue
of seeing it as a fai 1 ing--that is to say, who
shares the standards or expectations in terms of
which it is a failing, (p.222)
This precisely puts the situation of the one who fails in
nursing practice situations under the eye of the external
watcher or witness, or of the self. The sense of shame,
and, indeed the dynamics of both shame and guilt need to
be part of the understanding of students, nurses,
educators, and supervisors in order to appropriately deal
with failures or incompetence and with the focus on
preservation of agency and restoration to confidence.
The dynamic of how shame is experienced and the sense of
shame acquired has the consequence of impaired agency in
a number of ways, the hiding or wishing to hide, the
necessity of certain ideations and behaviors that
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restrict freedom and inhibit the projection of an
integral self in life choices.
The sense of guilt derives from the infraction of moral
rules and is similarly described as a painful experience.
The writer takes this associated pain as a point of
departure. Are there notions of the nature of the pain
experience which may allow a distinguishing of shame and
guilt rather than regarding it as an area of commonality
to both?
Conceptual Analysis of Pain
Buytendijk (1973) begins his conceptual analysis of pain
from the concrete phenomenon of 'a man in pain', and
distinguishes two basic types. Primarily, the image of
man in pain is reflexive and purposive; secondarily it is
as an expressive act. Indicative of pain as an
expressive act is the image of the injured, that is, the
suffering man's expressions are indicative of a state.
Pain attacks man in his physiopsychological unity; he no
longer experiences something confronting him but in
himself. Buytendijk discusses three results of this
attack on man in his psychophysical unity. There is a
direct effect of the pain as unavoidable and he seems
irrevocably abandoned. Secondly, a disturbed physical
integrity destroys structural connection of the sensory
motor system. Thirdly, and most importantly for this
discussion of the relation to shame and identity, the
emphasis is laid on self-consciousness in the sense that
experiences are experienced as one's own. The
consciousness of self and the external world is
increasingly clear through all forms of the 'enduring'
image; and there is certainty of the reality of whatever
(for example, shame) strikes or pushes me as given in
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endurance, which is experienced just as directly as the
fact of pain itself. This experience is one which
concludes in the form of being afflicted. The state of
being afflicted is suffering. As opposed to the act of
being injured, in pain as an incident or passing event,
suffering is a permanence of feeling comparable to
displeasure or annoyance which becomes different when it
lasts a long time. Further, suffering and grief isolate
the afflicted one from others and from one's sense of
self, as depicted in a father's experiences in the death
of his child (Hauerwas, 1992). These deformations (and
likewise transformations) of one's self influence agency
in meaningful ways with varying degrees of intensity and
duration in time.
The empathic character of continual pain consists in its
features of: 1) being forced to endure without being able
to offer resistance, and 2) the senselessness of the
disturbance to the shattered vital integrity and mental
life. Suffering as a more passive state is expressed in
abandonment of effort, a 'being dragged away without
protest'. Here the agent may be reduced to weeping which
is neither an action nor an expressive movement, but a
personal act--an 'act of inner surrender'. These act-
state, active-passive aspects of pain and suffering are
important for the questions of autonomy and expression of
personal identity. Further, pain and suffering can
terrorize, weakening the agency of the shamed or guilty
person and can produce more kinds of torture through
altering the agency of those in power, increasing their
viciousness (Scarry, 1985). It is these dimensions of
the effects of pain and suffering and altered agency
which are heightened and practised in varying degrees of
terrorism. They can be experienced also as part of
perceived threats, which can reduce agency of the one who
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suffers the threat without actual physical attack or
injury. This confirms Ricoeur's (1966) insistence that
pain is tied to an external aggression, to the
intersection of the existent and the forces of nature.
This is why it stimulates a reaction which avoids or
repels the hostile agent, while at the same time losing
energy to positive agency for moral projects.
There is, by contrast, a pain associated with lack, a
painful lack which exists prior to encounter with the
other. It moves toward this encounter; it is a lack
which is active prior to it, and that is why it cannot in
any sense be assimilated into a reflex to pain, or to a
concealed aversion. The shamed, lacking a sense of self
as integral, seek isolation and hiding, not wishing to be
seen. This dynamic explains the shame of the youth
hiding his lame foot as based in the pain of a lack of
normalcy.
This characterisation is inherent in need also, but when
its object is recognised there is an impetus arising from
within and a call coming from the outside, from the
presence of the known object. Presence becomes the light
of the lack and shows the terminus of the active affect.
The light in the absence of the object, prior to a new
encounter and possession, is the imagined. While playing
an exploratory role in the perfectly inner worldly
concern of the lack, the imagination also functions as a
militant power in the service of a diffuse sense of the
future by which we anticipate the actual-to-be. The
painful need can move toward agency.
Before relating these aspects of pain and suffering to
the distinction of shame and guilt and their implication
for personal identity and interactions of persons, it may
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be helpful to discuss the origin of the pain and
endeavours for restoration. Bonhoeffer (1955) locates
the origin of the sense of shame in the most fundamental
disunion. He states: "Shame is man's ineffaceable
recollection of his estrangement from the origin; it is
grief for this estrangement, and the powerless longing to
return to unity with the origin" (p. 20). To be aware of
the sense of shame or an experience of shame is the
awareness that he "...has lost something which is
essential to his original character, to himself as a
whole... "(p. 20.) From the response of man to this
disunion, Bonhoeffer notes that shame implies both a
positive and a negative attitude moving between self
concealment and self-revelation between solitude and
fellowship. He maintains that both these elements of
covering and disclosing are always present. There are
many practice challenges to students and nurses, in which
failure to act or taking incorrect action produces these
pain and suffering effects in the centres of agency of
the person--spirit, mind, will, presence and intention
(Williams, 1993) and alters the articulation of one's
self-identity as a responsible self. The inclusion of
this type of analysis in the curriculum can serve the
nurse and all their future patients by raising the agents
consciousness and orienting their responses to the need
rather than lack dynamic for resolution.
Of importance to our concern for actuation of the agent
is the discussion of the ways in which we make external
and internal painful endeavours to restore lost unity by
either a conscious and resolute or else a passionate and
devoted inward overcoming of shame as the sign of
disunion. As an instance of the first type of endeavour,
Bonhoeffer cites meeting the gaze of a stranger as
required, for example, in making a declaration of
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personal loyalty; and refers to this as a kind of
violence. An instance of the second type is the seeking
of the gaze of the other, as in love; it is a kind of
yearning. The dimension of appropriate modes of
restoration is not a strong part of professional practice
and it is important to distinguish two concepts in
relation to the inward overcoming of shame and actuation
of the commitive moral agent. Remorse may be mistaken
for shame and confused with regret. Dictionary
definitions and Opdycke (1949) treat regret as indicating
slight mourning or sorrow; as containing an element of
self-reproach, though without the acuteness of the
feeling of hopelessness to rectify the situation. This
latter idea he attributes to remorse. In remorse, the
distress or gnawing, the 'biting again' of conscience for
something done or left undone is experienced together
with a sensing of the fact that the cause cannot be
righted and all attempts at alleviation must remain
futile. The more strongly negative connotations of
remorse are highlighted in literature where one may find
remorse referred to as the poison of life with the
caution to avoid being tempted of engage in it. Perhaps
these elements led Cua among others to attribute remorse
more to guilt and to associate regret with shame.
The implication of these distinctions require that these
subconcepts may be explored further. McCabe makes this
distinction: regret means realising that you now wish
you had not behaved in a certain way; remorse is the
realisation that you did not really wish to behave in
that way at the time; that the behaviour was contrary to
your deepest desires, your need to be truly yourself" (p.
63). This casting of remorse as closely related to
personal identity, as choosing contrary to the preferred
option, reveals it to be a meaningful dimension of the
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sense of shame and lost honour. McCabe continues:
"Remorse is much more catastrophic than regret; it is a
revolutionary act in the sense that it involves a
reassessment of your past, a rewriting of your
autobiography" (p. 61) or self narrative.
Ricoeur (1966) describes remorse also as particularly
...based on the painful certitude that I could have
done otherwise. A reproach arises from unused power
which could have been devoted to a betrayed value;
it besets the act which was wasted freedom and more
than the act, calls the self whose spokesman in the
world the act is, to expiation, (p.188)
This expiation is in terms of the transformation of the
person in repudiation of shame as opposed to the
reparation associated with the removal of guilt. Ricoeur
claims that to describe shame as "the consciousness of
being irremediably what I always was", is to view self as
an object in a degraded, fixed, dependent being and seems
much closer in this totalization view to a description of
despair. The expression and view of self are a
totalizing and absolutizing of the condition that
produces hopelessness and despair (Lynch, 1965), which
are powerful enemies of agency. The fixedness and
dependent irremediabi1ity seem based in a confusion of
the concept of shame with a mistaken notion of remorse
that includes elements of the dynamic of hopelessness, as
discussed below.
There is a further idea in reference to regret that is
expressed with the metaphor of a wave which breaks and
pounds upon the now, stricturing the present with the
past and immobilizing the agent. This view aligns regret
more closely to guilt. The etymological derivation of
regret connects the elements of 'to greet again' and 'to
weep, ' a passive surrender.
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That the above references to remorse do not necessarily
align it with only the retrospective but with the more
prospective aspect of shame may be seen also in the
following quotation from Scheler (1960)
Remembering is the beginning of freedom from the
covert power of the remembered thing and occurrence.
It is precisely by being remembered that experiences
usually make their exit from the inner temple of our
life; it is the way in which they become detached
from the centre of the self whose attitude to the
world they formerly helped to form, and in which
they lose their direct impact, (p. 41)
Remembering and confronting in ways of resolution would
deal with remorse and regret as part of the painful,
suffering experience of shame and guilt but with
different important implications for actuation, for the
prospective and retrospective focus of the self-reference
of the agent, as well as for the personal identity
imputed in strong evaluation (Taylor, 1976). Implicit in
these relations are what Ricoeur (1966) terms the
indicative of evaluation and the imperative of decision.
Both are incorporated in self-reference which is a
certain way of again relating oneself or of behaving with
respect to oneself.
It is at this juncture that shame and honour are related.
There is an implication of the self rigorously
contemporaneous with the very act of decision which in
some sense is an act with reference to the self. Ricoeur
maintains that his implication of the self must contain
the willing available to the judgement of responsibility;
"It is I who..." and the judgement of identity "It is I."
I affirm myself as the subject precisely in the object of
my willing. In his later works, Ricoeur sees this I as
the one who acts and speaks for in self narrative (Kemp
& Rasmussen, 1989). Cua does not think there is an
important distinction between the sense of shame and the
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sense of honour, which may be an expression of social and
educational preparation in an oriental culture. He
ascribes the differentiation to a difference in emphasis,
a viewing of the positive or negative aspect of one same
phenomenon. This could be the associated internal
outcome of each strong evaluation chosen aright to one's
honour or amiss of one's true identity to one's shame.
In the elaboration of the range of expressions to be
articulated by the strong evaluator and the personal
identity, which informs the rejection of one or another
among conflictual desires (Frankfurt, 1976), the
metaphors of "basing oneself" and "thrust" are
descriptive. I base myself in order to "thrust forward".
In its initial development in the very young, the
successful negotiation of the child's movement away to
act on its own and return to the positive approval
received in response from the parent is crucial to the
formation of an independent, autonomous individual
capable of projecting him or herself actively in projects
(Erikson, 1959; Doi, 1974). Lacking appropriate
confirmation the individual becomes reticent and
passively dependent.
In using the metaphors of "being based " and "thrusting
forward", Ricoeur emphasises that ..."the mental act of
basing oneself establishes the bond between the
foundational and the voluntary act. In this way, a
possible motive becomes a genuine foundation for willing"
(Ricoeur, 1966, p. 68). The word "motive" is used solely
in the sense of a foundation of willing which makes a
demand and, correlatively, "motivation" means the basic
relation of foundation of willing which demands that a
voluntary act be based upon it. This is the root of the
personal identity factor in self as expressed in degrees
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of achievement of moral ideals. It also represents the
disunion from the personal identity factor in the self
when one acts away from or against the ideal.
The term or end point of a given experience of the sense
of shame is acceptance by oneself and by other.
Acceptance becomes the state for "basing oneself," a
foundation of willing oneself which demands a "thrust,"
a voluntary act based upon the foundation of willing.
"Thrust or demands are for expression of personal
identity in terms of ideal themes" (Cua, 1978, pp.123-
125). Basing oneself is precisely the sense of self-
regard and self-respect that reflects the honour
appropriate in thrust. Herein the relations of shame to
personal identity, to honour and ambition become more
clear. The agent is like an artist moving toward,
thrusting forth to clarify the ideal theme. The
commitive moral agent's thrust is to personal expression
of self in terms of projects which are embodiments of the
moral ideals and themes.
This actuation potential is not present in the term of
the sense of guilt. Guilt focuses on the thing done or
undone, as a separate, discrete act of transgression
(Morris, 1971). The psychological model for guilt
involves a victim or enforcer as the internalised figure
(Williams, 1993). The attitude of the internalised
figure is anger, with the subject's most primitive
reation being fear at the anger, then fear of anger, and
fear of recrimination. In relation to the other who has
been violated by the infraction of the rules, the term of
guilt for the moral agent is in the state of being
pardoned or forgiven. The emphasis is on decision making
and retribution or forgiveness. Retribution may lack
prospective orientation and the state of forgivenness is
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such that no further or future claims may be made against
the agent.
Thus, it would appear that shame in its inherent dynamic
is a motivation to future actuation of the commitive
moral agent. The motive is precisely restoration and
maintenance of personal identity in relation to the
prospective ideal. This view relates to ethics as
expression, communication, and is amplified in the work
of Holland (1978). Holland stresses the synthesis of
personal identity as the living out of ever-new
transformations of a basic identity theme with choices as
patterns of repetition and contrast, sameness and change,
theme and variation. He concludes that the principle of
identity maintenance offers the strongest and most
comprehensive theory of motivation.
As a component of actuation, the importance of the pain
experience should now be restated in relation to shame.
Pain in relation to shame would seem to be much more an
act, a relatively transient expression of the injured as
seen or found out. This may be contrasted with the state
of regret-upon-regret, enduring suffering of a guilt that
lacks forgiveness or retribution. The experience of a
painful lack and the agent's subsequent movement toward
encounter with the other (and the expression of the
ideal) seems most appropriately to be part of the
prospective dynamic in the conceptualisation of shame.
Further, it is precisely the consciousness-expressive
movement feature of pain that 'places' or 'bases' the
agent for thrust which is required in the exercise of
ambition by the man or woman acting in the honour of his
or her particular place, person, and purpose.
In conclusion, one may refer also to the enjoyment
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dimension and note in it a parallel of the foundation-
thrust dimension of actuation of the commitive moral
agent. Enjoyment, in its relation to the resolution of
a need or lack, may tend to move to action also. In a
presence or strong imagined presence or, by anticipation,
union with an actual-to-be there is movement and rest of
agency. The philosopher and literary critic, C. S. Lewis
(1955) as a most astute observer of human behaviour
reflected on his experiences of grief and joy. In the
time of grief the response to something enjoyed was an
embarrassment or sense of shame, and a deeper expression
of the lack or need of what was underlying what was
sensed as lost or not sufficiently remembered; like the
distinction of a wave's imprint on the sand as the real
rather than the wave itself. The sense of shame in this
instance is that of one's being in and doing in the world
but of not being at home-in-the-world, not being-in-
place. Our pursuit of the highest significance and
embodiment of the ideal is the on-going attempt for
synthesis through actuation, and results in self-
identification and union.
The Role of Hope in Relation to Agency
The nature of hope is generally thought to be a
facilitator of potential for action and a quality for
endurance in action. Nursing literature has focused on
a view of hope in the individual form; the hope of the
patient, whether such hope is justified, and to what
extent the nurse in practice is to support well-founded
hope for recovery or to gently redirect the patient's
'false' hope to a more reality-based acceptance of the
inevitable. Discussion may include whether the nurse,
with honesty and truth-telling as professional values and
personal virtues, could ever countenance tacit support of
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"false" hope as justifiable practice. Nurses are
concerned to avoid the potentially negative effects of
the false objective of the patient's hope, such as
complete recovery or cure, unachievable outcomes of
plastic surgery, and restoration to complete pre-trauma
functioning. For example, Weiss remarked that when
confronted with a less than hoped for outcome of the
surgery proposed for him, that in our treatment we prefer
cure to remedies, especially if the therapy is costly in
pain or suffering.
There are other dimensions of hope that need to be
addressed in relation to the practice of this aspect of
nurse agency. A less explored aspect of hope is its
social rather than individual form, in which the
structure of hope is explored as a social system and as
communion. How does personal and relational hope affect
nurse agency? To what extent can an analysis of hope
provide a basis for creative relational and institutional
practice of the moral agent?
Lynch (1965) declared that hope "comes close to being the
very heart and centre of a human being" (p. 23); using
imagination, not fantasy, to break through the unreality
of the absolutizing instinct to wish for and move toward
help with a sense of the possible. In the inward aspect,
the individual moves through fantasy and the unreality of
absolutizing to a sense of the possible and learns the
reality areas in which for man to choose is absolute, and
that makes the choice right. In the outward move from
alienation and the willful act, the individual accepts
relation, the elements of mutuality, and the taking of
help in relation to existence and facts in the present
moment. When acknowledged, the fact, a truth, or a
reality establishes a foundation or a kind of absolute
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that can eliminate the sense of endlessness and the
hopeless displacements that work to fatigue the spirit of
the person.
A regained energy is freed to serve the person as agent
in active and creative composition or construction of new
realities. The person as agent is most freed and
efficacious in hoping and coping with the reality to be
built when that reality is regarded as not conflictual.
To work under the view that reality is constructed on
basically conflictual lines, would be kind of reversal to
absolutizing. The effect would be restrictive to agency
since it would seem that if one absolutely necessary
human goal were reached another would have to be
relinquished. In Lynch's view, the great human
contraries were meant to support each other and
peacefully yield fruitful relations between dependence
and independence. To be, as we realistically are,
dependent, does not mean to sacrifice autonomy, nor can
one be autonomous without being dependent. These latter
aspects of Lynch's analysis move the work from a
psychology toward a metaphysics of hope. To identify
aspects of reality which are healing and freeing for
existence and action in and upon that reality is an
essential component of actuation of moral agency as
envisioning the "hoped for" and the "hoped that" in the
"hope for us", and articulating that vision. Pieper's
(1986) analysis of hope identifies the person as wayfarer
as does Marcel's (1962). Pieper' development of the
range of hope's expressions in relation to hope's object
counters two kinds of hopelessness. The "not yet"
transformed to the "already" is presumption and works
against agency. Hope's object can also impress as "not
ever", the anticipation of nonfulfilment, which produces
despair. The "not yet", but "not, not ever" affirms the
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anticipation of fulfilment, as hope in the one on the way
moves the agent steadily toward the object and promise.
This wayfarer orientation to hope is included in the
summary analysis of Godfrey (1987). Godfrey's study of
deep hope which uses analysis of Gabriel Marcel's (1951)
Homo Viator, and other authors in synthesis of his own
reflection. Godfrey stressed that the views of
philosophers converge concerning the goal of hope as
having not an individual but a social form which is
explored as social system and as communion. This is a
very different approach than that usually stressed in
nursing education and practice, which focuses on the hope
of and for the individual. The implication of the social
from of hope's goal will be discussed further after the
analysis of the kinds and models of hope.
Two kinds of hope are distinguished which Godfrey views
as equally significant. One is hope that has an aim and
is one's deepest hope, which he terms ultimate hope. The
other, called fundamental hope, is hope without an aim,
which is a tone or basic disposition as one faces the
future. Ultimate hope is aimed at a social target,
exercised in the face of obstacles and expressed in a
certain kind of desiring, reckoning or believing. The
discussion to follow will demonstrate the structures
which relate the two kinds of hope and the two models of
hope, and consider the implications of hope for the
commitive moral agent and as a virtue which may be
identified as one of the goods internal to nursing
practice.
Basic to hope and part of its strong implications is that
hope will emerge as judgements of possibi1ity--what a
person who hopes, believes is possible. Godfrey states
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that these beliefs obtain on three levels: 1) beliefs
about how benefits come about, 2) one's ontological
beliefs, that is, whether the intersubjective is
confirmed in reality or whether at best only fair-minded
systems of utility are believed possible; and 3) beliefs
concerning the concrete availability of agencies
appropriate for bringing about or contributing to the
objective. A feature of the aim or target of hope is
that what is hoped for is really a state of affairs or an
event, not a thing or an item. Hope-that is the precise
expression of the target of hoping understood not as
things but as states of affairs or events; not as objects
but as objectives. Added features of hope are that
hope's objectives should be definite, have a future
orientation, and be accurate in stating what is desired
and believed possible. Different kinds of hope
objectives may require different kinds of agencies. For
example, where love and creation are involved, agencies
may be different from those required for purely material
results. This has implications for the exploration of
the kinds of agencies necessary for the practice of
existential advocacy (Gadow, 1980) or of "moderated love"
which Campbell ( 1984) maintains in the nature of the
relationship of health care givers and patients or
clients.
Frameworks or models of hope can be based upon the
primacy of the self as subject, approaching hope as an
attitude; and the primacy of the interpersonal, which
approaches hope as essentially a relation. The focus of
Godfrey's analysis is on hope becoming "sound" and on the
trust that characterises sound hope, rather than on
specific concern about warranted or "justified" hopes.
Hope has cognitional conditions as well as implied
beliefs, a conative side with desiring of different kinds
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and an affective side, the "hope-in" or trust. Sound
hope refers to hope that is positively linked to human
well-being and takes account of the how of hope as well
as the what of hope.
The implications of hope are viewed as dependent upon two
ontological models of reality, the subject-object or
will-nature sort, and the intersubjective model. In the
subject-object or will-nature model, the principle
relationship to reality is an agent's utilisation of
objects. The principal relationship to reality is an
agent's utilisation of objects. The principal
relationship to reality in the intersubjective model is
a self's appreciative presence to a "thou".
The Will-Nature Model of Hope
Within the will-nature model, hope can be analysed in
the dimensions of desiring and calculation. Value in
this model is valuing, and may be an arbitrary wanting
with no connection with facts. Calculation is carried
out concerning events or states in nature among objects.
The type of fulfilment is mastery, successful possession,
consumption or utilisation. The will in this model is
regarded as either arbitrary and imperial, or as in
accord with and ratifying nature or another's will. The
types of hope's objectives accorded place are those for
either the agent's own benefit or the benefit of one
other than the agent. The model takes the subject as
free agent and the object as the realm in which agency is
carried out. Uti1isation is the principal relationship
that links the agent and object. The other serves as
instrument for the agent's purposes in the model's
neutral determination. A negative determination is
conceivable when the other is an obstacle to hope's
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objective. When the other is deterministically or freely
supportive, is "ally", the model's positive determination
is evidenced.
The Intersubjective Model of Hope
The intersubjective model takes hope realities as related
in appreciation: in appreciating and being appreciated,
in accepting and being accepted. While the
interrelationships in the will-nature model admit of
further determination as positive, neutral, or negative,
the intersubjective model has only positive
interrelationship. Rather than successful utilisation,
the type of fulfilment congruent with the inter¬
subjective model is union, though this outcome may be
beyond the terms laid down by the participants. The
objective of hope that harmonises with this model is
relational benefit or shared life; the hope expressed is
"hope-in" as well as "hope-that". Knowledge is acquired
through appreciative presence in human persons, through
personal dialogue. There is no strict dichotomy between
fact and value; knowing and valuing go together
essentially, with desiring or wanting being more
responsive and less arbitrary. In knowing, a gap is
experienced between reality and its explanations. The
gap is not just a lack of details or of extent but it is
its depth which is at issue. Human action is explained
at a level where choosing and being chosen are not
opposed, rather than the agent being as between the
dilemma's horns of freedom and determinism.
Fundamental and Ultimate Hope
Fundamental hope at its core refuses to judge that "all
is lost" or "I am lost" and so it cannot exist without
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at least some minimal, aimed, ultimate hope. Ultimate
hope has the form of realistic judgements of possibility
and beliefs about desirability. Any aimed hope, and
necessarily sound ultimate hope, implies that what is
hoped for is believed to be both possible and desirable.
In relation to cognitional beliefs, ultimate hoping is
such that actual, though perhaps unacknowledged,
believing is a necessary ingredient. Conatively, kinds
of readiness or dispositions are implied when hope is
sound; a person then prepares to act or interact in ways
consistent with and required for the objective's real
possibility. Especially noteworthy is that if a person
is not so disposed, the hope is unsound, that is, as
discussed above, the how of the hope has not been taken
into account along with the what of hope, breaking the
link to the human well-being condition of sound hope.
Affectively, through trust, both ultimate and fundamental
hope can be more than an attitude or climate of the mind
Hope's trust is an organ of apprehension for
appreciative presence knowing.
Since there is an implied judgement of worth or
desirability in any hoping, hope implies evaluation. In
sound hope, characterised by simple absolute desiring,
the objective is assessed according to its own merits.
The merits may be either instrumental, that is, desired
as a means to something else; or merits may be desired
for the objective's own sake. While parts of a complex
ultimate hope's objective may be instrumental, the whole
is desired for its own sake. Evaluation of these ends
can be made according to their worth or desirability in
themselves and for their possibility or likelihood as
social objective.
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An implication of the levels and types of models is that
they are largely decisive for hope's being understood in
a theistic or atheistic way. This difference can be
related to the underlying ontologies of person as
discussed above and shown to be decisive in the same way.
Extension of the Intersubjective Model of Hope
The relational dimension of hope is developed as a
theology of hope by Moltmann (1967). He maintains that
the person and self identity are not a complete identity
as a result of the choice to be and become what I am.
Neither does the possible hold the key position in
articulating a sound and healing hope as Godfrey and
Lynch emphasise. In man's relation to the creator God,
the questions: Who or what is man?. Who am I?, are not
answered by comparison with other humans or animals.
Self knowledge comes about as man is confronted by "the
mission and call of God, which demand impossibilities of
man" (p. 285). This includes knowledge of self, of men,
and of guilt, and it is also, "knowledge of the
impossibilities demanded by the divine mission" (p. 285).
By discovering the discrepancy between the divine mission
and his own being, man learns what he is and what he is
to be, yet of himself cannot be. With his call, the
prospect of a new ability to be, and a promise of God's
being with him, he will learn his human nature and
identity from the future to which the mission leads as he
keeps hopeful trust.
Moltmann depicts man as not established, as a pilgrim or
wayfarer, homo viator; his human nature first becomes
really determinable in the light of the determination to
which it is on the way. Man is clearly also a homo
absconditus, hidden from himself. He is open to the new,
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with promised possibilities of being and the
possibilities of the future which are obscure.* And yet
when this future is opened to him as he comes on the
horizon of mission, these possibilities do not reveal man
to himself for what he really is. Here again, new
possibilities open up to him, with the result that he can
become what he is not yet and never yet was.
This involves a new kind of thinking about the world, an
expectation-thinking of the future of faith; the being is
on the way to true humanity appointed to all men who
assume open responsibility for humanity's hope for the
future of man. What man is in his relations is
disclosed in its reality from the direction of the life
he lives. "Creative action springing from faith is
impossible without new thinking and planning that springs
from hope" (p. 35). In this articulation, self identity
is developed from within our presence to the interplay of
covenant and mission.
In the promises, the hidden future already announces
itself and exerts its influence on the present through
the hope it awakens. While truth statements are found in
facts that can be shown to agree with existing reality,
which we can all experience, hope's statements of promise
must stand in contradiction to the reality which can at
present be experienced. Hope's statements do not result
from experiences but are the condition for the
possibility of new experiences.
In summary, this analysis of creative moral agency and
factors affecting its actuation has addressed the way in
which the professional nurse in practice can be regarded
and developed as a commitive moral agent to the point of
becoming paradigmatic of moral ideals in areas which
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challenge existing practice. Identifying and analysing
the external and more especially the internal components
of creative agency requires rethinking and deeper
analyses of the nature of person.
The study of the dynamics of human characteristic and
experiences are directly related to the underlying
ontologies of person upon which they are based. The
critique of these analyses is in essence the critique of
the related view of the nature of person, the rational
and objective explanation, as against the elements of the
counter view, the intersubjective, relational
appreciation of person.
In the analyses above, these differing models of person
are reflected in varying views of common concepts, such
as shame and hope, in our individual and in our shared
professional life. The alternative perspectives can be
developed and presented as part of the pluralistic
reality of practice. The deeper analysis and new
articulations of these concepts and situations will place
professional nurses at a higher level of moral discourse
and personal conviction-based agency. The significance
is that this will result in new approaches to challenging
patient care and care delivery situations, which in the
moral ethical dimension are comparable to the challenges
in advanced scientifically-based care. Our ethical
challenges are equally urgent and require equally
rigorous systematic study and rewarded support.
The dynamics of actuation of moral agency are interactive
in the external and internal being and operations of the
person by inwardness to a deep self and relationally in
shared moral ideals and life. Each component would seem
to have many aspects that are related in significant ways
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to actuation of moral agency and creativity, such as the
will and freedom or corporate and individual values. The
study of the dynamics of values, virtues and agency in
relation to practice is part of the practice of the
reflective and responsible nurse.
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CHAPTER SIX
ARTICULATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMITIVE AND CREATIVE
MORAL AGENCY IN NURSING EDUCATION AND PRACTICE
Nursing, medicine and health care systems are confronted
with complex and interrelated challenges of information,
and biotechnologies, socio-economic, and moral ethical
issues. The demands which these conditions and concerns
place upon nurses as individuals and as an international
professional community are receiving increasing attention,
especially in light of the year 2000 as an incentive for
goals and accomplishments. While nursing has made a clear
response to changes in modalities of practice and provided
for preparation in moral ethical decision making, the
dimension of execution of decisions, and more importantly,
actuation of moral agency in commitive and creative moral
practice remains a challenge to educators and
practitioners.
The purpose of this thesis was to explore concepts involved
in a system of meaning called moral agency in nursing
practice, and to identify the meaning of and means for the
commitive and creative actuation of moral ethical agency.
The interrelated components of the ontology of person and
moral agency were envisioned as indicating aspects of a
process framework that focuses on actuation of
appropriately reasoned moral decisions, the nature of
commitive moral agency, and facilitators and constraints
to creative ethical actions. Methods and techniques are
part of, and may not be isolated from, the system of
meaning which gives direction to their use in achieving the
goods toward which they aim.
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Based on insights from a process journey of experiences and
the literature, such a framework was envisaged as including
concepts of person and self identity, virtues and an ethics
of virtue in relation to practice, the actuation of moral
agency, and creative moral agency. A set of interrelated
study questions were raised to guide the further journeying
and the process of presentation, in order to focus on
identifying a set of components and concepts that
emphasised development and actualisation of moral agency.
The questions were presented initially to engage the
reader and to evoke the reader's own thinking about the
issues and components during the ensuing presentation. Now
as part of the illuminative process, a restatement of the
questions enables an assessment of "to whence we have
come".
Study Questions and Response
Confronted with the problems and issues that challenge the
nurse as moral agent, how can educators best prepare the
nurse for commitive and creative moral and ethical
practice?
1. In what ways does knowledge of the nature of the
person facilitate the reflective nurse as moral agent
to actualise that agency in practice situations?
2. What internal qualities maintain to inform and
move or inhibit the moral agent in actuation of
practice choices or creative responses to practice
challenges?
3. What is the structure of a process-oriented
framework of knowledge, concepts and skills needed for
educational preparation for actuation of moral agency?
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The intent of these interrelated questions as heuristic and
as generating exploration continues, in the spirit of the
poet Robert Frost who wrote of "the pursuit of a pursuit
forever". There are, nevertheless, initial responses or
first approximations to the questions, as well as
invitations to further study which can be deduced from
analyses in this thesis.
In the following section, a preliminary synthesis of the
content is presented in response to the questions.
Subsequently, the components of a framework for development
of agency in education and practice are demonstrated with
the incorporation of content and process methods.
How does the reflective nurse as moral agent actualise that
agency in morally creative ways in response to practice
situations?
The nature of the person is a rich resource for the
specific and detailed analysis, and the ontologies are
developed from distinctive points of departure and types
of analytical approaches. As revealed in the literature
and experiences used to support this study, from one
perspective the reflective nurse as a moral agent
actualises agency by knowing oneself as being based in the
dimensions of person, self, and idios, the I. Each
dimension has epitomisations or further manifestations,
which insistently act against and with others to become
expressed according to its inherent nature. Particularly,
the I, as manifest (epitomised) in autonomy, accountability
and responsibility, is significant to actuation of agency.
Examples and case scenarios can be developed readily
to clarify and support the concepts and presented to assist
the learner with needed application. Likewise the learner
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can be asked to make application by relating the concept
to his or her own experience. Weiss' distinct definitions
of frequently use terms, which are sometimes used
interchangeably in practice areas, enables the learner to
differentiate the instances of the terms accurately as
acted out or experienced in practice.
Pertinent to actuation of agency are the development of
self identity by strong evaluations (Taylor, 1976 & 1979),
articulating a clear moral ideal (value) and developing
fact/value-based principles of practice. These are
fruitful processes for self assessment and self development
of the learners, revealing both personal strengths and
weaknesses.
The ideas of embodying virtues in a form of life, way of
life and style of life (Cua, 1978) in order to sustain and
imbue practice in the tradition (Maclntyre, 1985) is an
insight for the young professional to grow with. As
articulated for the nurse educator in a humorous way, one
such statement that was used to suggest way and form of
life was, "If you are going to be a nurse educator you have
to be prepared to spend time in libraries and make friends
with librarians". This is not to divert from the
seriousness of commitment to the topic at hand. Rather,
it is to acknowledge that teaching the concept of a life
way, form and style to support one's practice needs to
employ enabling exercises for sets of skills, and not to
be introduced merely as concepts.
Films, role playing and journaling with someone who has
made a creative response, to special needs and situations
(Cua, 1978) are ways for the nurse to examine the way, form
and styles of life, which may also suggest the internal
qualities essential for their actuation of agency.
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What internal qualities maintain to inform and move the
moral agent to actuation of practice choice and moral
agency?
Internal qualities influencing the moral agent to empower
choice and action include the clear articulation of the
moral ideal that gives overall direction to the practice.
Conscious discussion and adoption of shared values
essential to the professional nurse (American Association
of Colleges of Nursing, 1986) and to the corporate
tradition (Hall, 1986) will be excellent grounding in
linking behaviours to goals and ideals. The virtues as
habits of being, character and self determination, as well
as the virtues inherent in being wholly engaged in the
practice (Maclntyre, 1985) are essential as well. Internal
effect of previous events and choices as limiting agency
need to be addressed in relations to ways and means for
resolution of limits to agency.
The learner can portray evolving understandings and efforts
to habituation of the intellectual and practical virtues
in reflective journals, script writing and poetry as well
as discussions with an advisor or mentor. Nurse educators
will need to incorporate theory of action and praxis into
the content on practice using a variety of sources, such
as Maclntyre (1995) on the nature of practice, and
understanding action and intentionality (Moya, 1990;
Wojtyla, 1979, 1981). The relation of the notions of
volition, the nature and dynamics of the will (Assagioli,
1974, 0'Shaughnessy, 1980; Charlton, 1988) and the related
concepts of freedom are important further the learner's
understanding of agency (Macmurray, 1978; Taylor, 1985),
autonomy and commitment. The development of these and
other aspects of agency can be made additional useful tools
of informed practice for nurses if focused efforts are made
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by the profession to strengthen this aspect of professional
life.
In the analysis of Stein (1989a), the animating and
energizing effects of the spirit as affecting a person's
activity and agency were identified. The place of the
spirit and the spiritual function is the person's
epitomised idios, (in Weiss' analysis of privacy, that is,
the individual human being), which functions in an
integrating, harmonising way to produce excellence of
unitary action. Experiences of spirit, and the manner and
processes of such experiencing (Shea, 1987) can be the part
of the focus of self or other observational reports. The
qualities of a sense of spiritual self inform and support
the person's quality of presence, composure, and confidence
in competent practice.
Spirituality in the nursing curriculum has focused on the
sets of beliefs and practices associated with religious
practices in different traditions and cultures. By
extension, the effects of these beliefs on the experiences
of illness, suffering, care and curative practices, and
hope for recovery are given attention in nurse preparation.
An approach more transformative and illuminative for nurse
agency is to address the nature of the spirit in writings
such as those of Stein, the functions of the spirit, and
the learner's own phenomenological reflection on the
difference of viewing oneself as an embodied spirit,
inspirited person, or as a spirit with a soul in a body.
The discussion of spiritual insights (Imperato, 1987;
Lonergan, 1978) and learners' identification of such
insights operating in their own or others lives can begin
to re-establish the language and awareness necessary for
each learner's personal development in spirit and for
inclusion of spirit-conscious care of patients.
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The inclusion of the functions of the spirit as a means for
consciousness and discussion can be accomplished as part
of a separate course on Spirituality in Nursing Care or as
integrated in content throughout the curriculum. The three
primary functions of the spirit as identified by Sandford
(1985) include: worship, communing with others and nature,
and sustaining life in the body. He expands these to nine
functions which include the ability to empathise, to know
that an other is grieved or joyous in spirit in silent
communication as Stein (1989a) describes in the act of
empathy.
Sensitivity, of which Weiss speaks as part of his
metaphysical analysis of person, is through the spirit that
actually guides in ways, subjects, and in interrelations
to create what was not part of sensibility, that is, of
the information or awareness from the senses. By these
functions we nurture the spirit in others and our own
spirit is nurtured. This suggests an important question
to be introduced in a spirit-focused concept of person and
agency: What nurture does the personal spirit require and
how does it receive it? If it is from its source, the
power of our life, What can keep this nurture from us?
What is it to lack, to run out of spiritual capacity to
function as I ought?
Corporate practice too can nurture by means of values
development, especially in relation to the moral ideal;
forgiveness and acceptance of forgiveness (as freeing self
and other to life and agency); remembrance, unity in
acknowledging expressions of corporate spirit, healing
humour and laughter, music and dance (corporate and
individual) can provide agency in community. Who are those
who have the greatest spiritual stamina? How do we assess
and intervene for the spirit that is enervated by the lack
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of spiritual nourishment and further by violations of
various kinds of abuse? The nurse's agency as affected at
its spirit base, would permeate all efforts to moral
ethical agency in practice.
Nurture through cherishing oneself invigorates our spirit
and is fully appropriate for one with the insight that "I
am loved by God and if God didn't love me I would cease to
exist". Our silence or prohibitions of spirit and
spiritual articulations work counter to full agency of the
responsive and responsible moral ethical agent.
These and other ways are necessary to restore what Taylor
(1989) reported as the loss of an adequate language to
articulate the spiritual. This is borne out in Bradshaw's
(1992) study of the extent to which nursing codes,
philosophy and curricula indicate the importance of the
spiritual dimension in nursing, but at the same time there
is lack of adequate definition and clarity for practice.
Conceptual and critical analyses of literature from
multiple perspectives permitted Bradshaw to demonstrate the
Judeo-Christian root of the concept and to identify its
philosophical treatment. These included positivist,
pragmatist and existentialist reactions, which can be
reflected in the presuppositions and assumptions of
nursing. Bradshaw concluded that the conceptions of the
spiritual dimensions in contemporary nursing could be
categorised as structural-functional, existential and
pantheistic positions. This indicates the need for
critical analysis of the presuppositions of nursing
philosophy and curricula, clearer articulation of the
nature and basis of the spiritual dimension, and provision
for the implications of pluralistic emphases.
In a time when there is a threat of a liberal-based, state-
136
enforced "public secularism" (Carter, 1993), nurse
educators are challenged to incorporate qualitative studies
of spirit and religious experiencing (Shea, 1987) to care
for our own need of inwardness as essential to the proper
care and benefit of patients.
Attention to and care for inwardness would include content
on the functions of the spirit and development of the life
of the spirit (Stein, 1989a, 1989b; Sandford, 1985 and
Progoff, 1965). The need of modern man is to be
transformed with respect to the quality of his or her
consciousness and enabled to move to a further level of
development in the interior aspect of life. The very
concepts used in thinking about and attempting to
articulate this "subject matter" will affect its meaning
and significance, either to alter to a higher, deeper level
or to rigidify and render it void.
This casts nursing as both a declarative and evocative
science. As declarative, it is a science which seeks to
make objective statements about a specific subject,
verifying these statements within a fixed frame of
reference. As evocative, it is one whose very formulations
stir up and change the subject being studied, which is the
person as an integrated being in health or seeking
restoration as an inspirited body/embodied spirit, that is
a spiritual body.
An intersubjective relational ontology of person and basis
for hope can be developed to include relevant aspects and
concepts in the care of this integrally spiritual being.
The concept of person as loving relationship with God is
an insight that is sufficiently deep to be capable of
unifying much of life. Thus, the patient confined by
infirmity or limited in capacities who is aware of this
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deep inter-relation of the one Root of his person and
identity, can give this insight expression by the thought:
"If God didn't love me, I wouldn't exist" (Imperato, 1987).
Articulations of creative agency include similar insights
or expressions of a basis for self identity that is
sufficiently strong to enable one to enact that conviction
and a related commitment to a level of care that has been
called a covenant (Ramsey, 1970) and moderated love
(Campbell, 1984). When this type of insight has penetrated
into the everyday life of nurse, patient or of any human
being, it has tremendous power to unify life experiences.
Further, there is great strength and power in the insight
that all the experiences are for the up- building of one's
life, of one's true person-identity in this loving
relationship.
Likewise, in the pluralistic, naturalistic environment,
many may articulate a different insight, an example of
which Taylor (1989) draws from literature, "If God does not
exist, then everything is permitted" (p. 10). What seems
very clear in each of the examples is the urge and
conviction to act based on such articulations.
Perhaps a distinction needs to be made and attention drawn
to an important difference expressed above. Person-centred
thought can be conceptualised in a short time, but to have
the meaning of the person become a "therapeutic insight",
that is, "one that challenges and deepens self
understanding and invites unification of one's experience"
(Imperato, 1987, p. 3) and permits the thrust to self
projection requires a developmental preparation beyond
intellectual readiness. The harmonising, integrating
influence of the idios in Weiss' (1983) metaphysical
account, which is suggestive of the Spirit of God in
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Christian accounts, might be seen at work in this process.
In the latter view, personhood is a relationship with God
that originates in intimacy with Himself. Person-centred
thought emerges from efforts and concern for God-centred
living in such an account of experienced reality.
In summary, with these opportunities and challenges, a plan
of action and a framework to organise the dimensions and
activities can also be an aspect of practice at the
personal, faculty or professional levels.
What is the structure of a process-oriented framework of
knowledge, concepts and skills needed for educational
preparation for actuation of moral agency?
Components of the Suggested Framework
The components of a framework of concepts and skills for
preparation to enhance actuation of moral agency will
require clear and careful review, selection, and definition
by nurses in a professional community or area of nursing
practice. This will become even more important in the
pluralistic, naturalistic climate. To recognise the need
and make the effort to enhance preparation in this way
requires that one be a reflective actuating moral agent.
The components of a framework for actuation of moral
ethical agency, as generated by and derived from the
analyses described in the preceding chapters include:
Delineation or discrimination of the dimensions of
person and personal identity
Articulation of the moral ideal of nursing and
principles of practice
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Role and models of virtues acquisition and
habituation
Discernment of the individual and corporate values
in relation to goal and means
Identification and understanding of exemplars
Portfolios and case studies of exemplary practice
Because methods and techniques are part of system of
meaning "moral agency in nursing practice", examples of
strategies, methods and techniques are included in the
synthesis of areas of content and processes with the
components of the framework.
Integration of Framework Components. Content, Processes
Curriculum content and process examples for the components
of the framework, as reflected in the presentation and
discussion in this thesis include:
Delineation or discrimination of the dimensions of
person and personal identity
The individual human being or privacy: the Person,
Self and I
The nature and sources of self-identity
The relation of self identity to articulations of
moral ideal and reasoned principles
Process methods include: Discussions,
Perpendicular Pronoun Game,
Self Narrative
Articulation of the moral ideal of nursing and
principles of practice
Alternative statements of the moral ideal in
nursing
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Assessment of presuppositions and assumptions of
each articulation of the moral ideal
Relation of moral ideal to reasoned principles of
practice
Virtues in support of a given moral ideal
Role and models of virtues acquisition and
habituation
Differentiation of virtues as character,knowledge,
self-determination
Specification and initation of acquisition:
link to self-assessment, to motivation and
goals
Link of habituation to will
Virtues inherent in practice
Process methods include: Reflective Journaling,
Moral Ideals Interviewing
Moral Ideals on Trial
Discernment of the individual and corporate values in
relation to goal and means
Articulation of the held values of the nursing
profession
Stages of values development
Virtues in support of values
Discernment of corporate values, development of
goals and mean
Assessment of compatibility of nursing and
corporate values, goals and means
Process Methods include: Values Inventory
"We hold these Values to be"
Assessment of Mission and
Philosophy Statements
Identification and understanding of exemplars
Nature and aspects of paradigmatic situations
Determination of situations calling for
paradigmatic intervention
Characteristics and qualities of the paradigmatic
person
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Process Methods include: Analysis of Nurse Leaders
Living History Videos
Sigma Theta Tau Archives
Interview of Choice
Portfolios and case studies of exemplary practice
Self-narrative of introduction and becoming
invested in and convicted of the need
Self-narrative of considered alternatives
Self-narrative in relation to one's articulated
moral ideal, and its relation to other moral
ideals expressed for the situation
Self-narrative of availability of inner
qualities
Case report and analysis of the process of
paradigmatic practice
Case report in relation to professional and
organisational support and resources
Case report of conditions and consequences of
implementation of the practice
Self-narrative of evaluation of virtues inherent
in the practice
Process Methods include: Be Our Guest: Watson,Rodmel1,
Norberg, Bradshaw
Case Analysis, Case writing
The concern in the process framework is to instill values
and ideals, and to encourage the learner as developing
within a tradition that has benefited by strong creative
use of moral agency. The programme offers seeds and light
for a confident and competent nurse to regard and care for
the sources of herself as agent and as precious to the
future of nursing practice. The identification and
development of nurses with the character and virtues for
this actualisation of the promise or promissory form of
their personal identity will always be a professional
concern. The use of a recent and growing base of new
source material can assist our efforts to relate character,
practical reasoning, strong evaluations and habituation of
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virtues for the shared life (Verbeke, 1990; Carr, 1991; &
Sherman, 1991). The discussion of special considerations
of the components, content and processes are detailed below
in the hopes of the seed for new crops.
Professional Practice Concerns
The focus of this thesis has been on the development of
moral agency and actuation of agency in nursing practice.
The analyses of the concepts related to agency in practice
have been applied both to the student in a programme of
basic preparation and the nurse in professional practice.
The context of broader social and professional concerns as
influencing practice in the tradition and agency in nursing
practices are presented in this concluding portion of the
study as challenges and questions to receive attention as
the nursing articulates its professional character into the
future.
Challenges to Commitive and Creative Moral Agency
Factors that militate against the development and actuation
of commitive and creative moral agency need to be
recognised and addressed systematically at the individual,
corporate, professional, and social levels. The pluralism
and relativism confronting the areas of our lives and
practice call for special consideration of the use of
consensus as a response to these conditions and as a
challenge to commitive and creative moral ethical agency.
Nurses need to give conscious thought to identify and
define the moral ideal directing professional practice.
While medicine has expressed its primary moral imperative
as "Do no harm", the moral ideal or imperative of nursing
has been articulated variously as:
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1. do what the patient would do for himself if he had
the necessary strength, will and knowledge
(Henderson, 1964);
2. assist the patient to exercise the right of self
determination and assist the patient to unify,
incorporate, and transcend lived and object body
experiences; that is, to do existential advocacy, to
be existential advocate (Gadow, 1980);
3. enhance the patient's self care (Orem, 1971).
4. foster the physical and psychological well-being
of patients, a moral imperative which is shared with
other human practices (Bishop & Scudder, 1990).
As noted above, the moral ethical ideal functions to guide
the practice, planning and policies of the nurse in
actuation of moral agency, and the practice, planning and
policies of the profession. Nurses may have difficulty
articulating the moral ideal which is foundational to and
guides their practice. Based upon an historico-critical
study. Fowler (1987) reported that over the past century
the central moral motif of nursing was the "ideal of
service". There are strong indications that this ideal of
service is being re-articulated as the ideal of caring.
The term 're-articulated' is used rather than 'replaced'
because there is no indication that caring was not always
a correlative to service. Equally clear in the discussion
above, is that the moral ideal functions as a standard for
evaluation as well as a guide to practice. The discussion
of moral ideals and the evaluation of evidence of their
application in practice should be part of nurses'
preparation and of onging clarification by practitioners.
Nurses will need to respond to pluralism and the increased
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emphasis on consensus as proposed for the determination of
virtue (Hope, 1989) and as it presents in types of practice
of some ethics committees (Jennings, 1991 & Tong, 1991).
Issues related to the dynamics, epistemology and ethics of
consensus, and alternative forms of ethics committee
functions, should be part of nurses' preparation and
continuing education.
The questions of this study were directed to what is
necessary to implement the articulated values and how the
virtues relate to moral agency, personal self identity and
specific contexts of nursing practice. Values and virtues
such as honesty, truthfulness, loyalty, reliability,
dependability, trustworthiness, caring, and compassion have
been identified in the nursing practice codes of various
countries. These values and related behaviours can be
regarded as part of our shared life. Identifying the ways
in which nurses manifest outstanding practice of the
values and virtues supportive of the moral ideal should
become a conscious effort, and appropriate acknowledgement
should be given in the reward system, which is designed to
recognise and reinforce valued behaviours.
There are distinct challenges and risks to commitive,
engaged practice of articulated principles (Hutchinson,
1990; Munhall, 1990; Barnett, 1993; and Snowdon & Rajacich,
1993). These risks are much more apparent than the risks
to the uncommitted self and to the one who lacks the moral
strength to act according to the conviction of articulated
principles. Being uncommitted to the practice results in
the loss of the internal goods and the virtues inherent in
practice, even though one receives the external good of
payment for work. In the second instance, to fail to act
according to the conviction of what is the good and right
thing to do inflicts a wound to one's self identity, and
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the possibility of barriers to future moral ethical action,
because of the effects of shame, guilt, remorse, and the
weakened capacity for agency. Therefore, part of the
framework for actuation of agency should include the need
for self assessment. Under what institutional and practice
challenges do my usually effective habits of being and
doing become unequal to commitment and answerability as the
one who acts in a moral ethically responsible way? Does
this sense of being unable to answer, that is, to
articulate an explicit strong evaluative position, occur
even apart from situations of values conflict?
Moral Ideal and Moral Vision as Facilitators to Agency
How shall the articulation of nurses' moral vision of the
preferred future of nursing practice and care delivery be
advanced as a moral enterprise on the part of nursing's
commitment to health care and well being?
In the climate of pluralism and the multiple moral ideals
that guide nursing education and practice, the moral
visions of a preferred future for nursing practice and care
delivery will also be multiple. This situation can be
turned to a positive outcome if the process of articulating
the moral ideal guiding any given educational program and
practice group is carried forward to delineate also its
related vision of nursing's preferred future. Examples of
such interrelated moral ideal to vision statements include:
The moral ideal of nursing as an interpersonal process is
to "assist an individual, family, or community to prevent
or cope with the experiences of illness and suffering and
... to find meaning in these experiences" (Travelbee,
1971, p.7). A related preferred future or moral vision
statement might be: "The professional nurse is positioned
as a health care practitioner who moves freely between
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agencies to provide the continuity of developmental care
necessary for examining the meaning of the experiences in
care and prevention of illness and suffering". Without
articulation of the vision related to our stated moral
ideal, energies are diverted in responding to ad hoc issues
and events that lack the focused development of agency in
practice.
The formal idea of a practice in nursing as presented here
cannot be relegated either to lofty philosophical truths
or to a practical wisdom regarding the how to' s of a skills
approach to care. What is needed is discriminating wisdom
as reflected in the Greek word sunesis. Sunesis is the
ability to make critical distinctions, to evaluate, to
perceive the conseguences of one's actions, to choose
rightly when the choices are not especially clear. To
apply sunesis is to apply critical faculties, to sift and
weigh, to affirm the familiar truth of statements as well
as the neglected truth--the "but", the "and also" to be
articulated for clearer understanding and action choices.
In addition, it involves the idea of anticipating the
implications and consequences prior to the choice and
acting in a provisional way. In particular, in times of
relativism and pluralistic claims, nurse scholars need to
seek and plant seeds of sunesis to counter passionate
polemics.
Challenges of Modernity and Existential Advocacy
The nurse holding the moral ideal of existential advocacy
is one who shows proactive concern for care of the patient
as embodied spirit and inspirited body. The existential
advocate avoids and protects against others approaching the
patient as a object of study or care. The internal goods
of this practice include discerning and responding to very
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different existential predicaments and fears of our time.
Taylor (1989) uses the results of his wide ranging analysis
of history and this modern time to picture the
circumstances. The client may be threatened by loss of
meaning, by unchallengeable expectations and frameworks,
that make tyrannical demands which produce the fear of
being unable to meet the expectations. The person in
search of meaning may feel nothing is worth doing in a
world which has lost its soul and the fear response can be
a terrifying emptiness, a dislocation or fracturing of
body-space relations.
Nursing education for existential advocacy as the moral
ideal needs to address existential predicaments in the
development and socialization of new nurses. Just as
important is the development of practicing nurses, who,
having gained the virtues inherent in the specific
practice, can now exercise creative agency in new
epitomisations, state new articulations of practice, and
develop new frameworks on the nature of their moral vision
quest-- fears diffusing and hopes re-established. Nurses
who recognise the extent and implication of the naturalist
temper reflected in patient situations can use improved
qualitative methods for study of spiritual, existential
predicaments and fears, and the nature of appropriate
therapeutic insights.
There are also reasons in our time, and deep in a certain
moral outlook, frameworks which will lead some nurses to
wish not to be involved in ontological claims but to think
and act more in keeping with the objective or scientific
outlook. This choice should have the intersubjective
appreciation and continuing dialogue of peers and the
profession.
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Nurse educators and practitioners are versed in the use of
frameworks and models for teaching, learning and practice.
In this thesis, areas have been suggested for elaborating
frameworks to include wider dimensions of influences on
commitive and creative nurse agency. These include a
broader range of factors affecting well-being, socio¬
economic, political and environmental components, operating
interactively and simultaneously. The concept of well-
being would include focusing especially on the relational
approach to person and its basis for the inclusion of study
and care of the spiritual nature of the person.
The reflexive turn has begun in nursing education under the
name of "the curriculum revolution"(National League for
Nursing, 1989) and has grown in identification and use of
qualitative, phenomenological methods in nursing research.
To appropriately identify and apply both approaches and
strategies in practice, education and research has been the
nursing profession's unarticulated state for some time.
This has been identifiable in the domains of behavioural
objectives, in which the chief area of underdevelopment is
in the experiential and narrative learning modes,
especially in relation to spiritual being and becoming.
Bradshaw (1992) makes an effective argument for the lack
of adequate definition of the spiritual dimension, which
in Taylor's (1989) terms would be called the ' inarticulacy'
of the dimensions of a framework that even allows us to
speak the words and to give them the full development
necessary for a balanced approach to the patient and
ourselves as persons.
Paradigmatic Nursing Practice
In search of exemplary, new epitomisations of nurse agency
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in specific areas of practice, the methods of case study
could be used to analyse new challenges and the ways
individual nurses would propose to respond in creative
ways. The development of the nurse's "portfolio" of
creative responses to challenges of care should be
appreciated as well as analysed and discussed in terms of
wider application. Process methods for these strategies
have been indicated in the elaboration of the components
of the framework in the previous section.
Nursing has a rich history of the exercise of creative
agency (Lanara, 1981). Cicely Saunders, confronted with
the needs of dying patients and holding an implicit moral
ideal of the covenant of care, articulated an exemplary
modality of caring and system of care delivery. Hospice
care has developed internationally in response to the
moral vision of interdisciplinary professional and
voluntary care matched to the special need of the patient
and family. Thirty-two years after the death of the
hospice's "founding patient". Dame Cicely Saunders narrated
the event as a response to a situation of the needs of many
similar patients. She restated her vision
In the hospice movement we continue to be concerned
both with the sophisticated science of our treatments
and with the art of our caring, bringing competence
alongside compassion. (Saunders, 1981, p.7)
Bradshaw (1992) has cited Pearce and McFarlane as exemplary
in their concern for and promotion of the spiritual
dimension in nursing education and practice. In these
persons, as exemplars, their concern is manifest in their
lives and writings with an integral coherence.
Contemporary projects and promises on the part of exemplary
and perhaps paradigmatic practice may appear controversial
and be subjected to rejection in the articulations of
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professionals in other traditions, cultures, or personal-
relational stances. According to Weiss (1983), it is
precisely against this resistance that the insistence of
the self and the I overcomes and integrates life elements.
This results in the agent's new epitomisations of self and
of practice, that is, a new response of a stronger
commitive and creative nurse agency, and a new paradigm for
care.
The articulation by Watson (1990) of a nursing theory
comprised of ten carative factors (factors of care), and
the development of the Centre for Human Caring at the
School of Nursing of the University of Colorado, attests
to the growing identification with the moral ideal,
practice and research in care and caring. "Instillation
of faith and hope" and the "formation of a humanistic-
altruistic system of values" are two factors of Watson's
theory that will challenge nurses to inwardness in the
pursuit of caring for these dimensions of the person. To
respond to those who regard care as a "soft" area of
qualitative research, the link to rational thinking and
decision-making (Thayer-Bacon, 1993) can be a model for
future research.
Perhaps, however, the greatest challenges will come to
those attempting to bring these elements into care of
patients in serious need, who are living under conditions
not easily controlled or corrected. The idea of call and
mission enters (Moltmann, 1967) with a hope for what
appears impossibilities rather than possibilities, and
requiring what Marcel (1951) calls "creative fidelity".
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The Experiment in Paradiqmity and Heroism in Nursing: A
Case Example
In search of an example of this phenomenon, the Norberg
(1980, 1982) project in the care of aging dementia patients
by including bottle feeding and cradling can be considered.
These actions may be regarded as an expression of an ideal
theme, an example of the covenant of care and cannons of
loyalty principles (Ramsey, 1970) articulated in practice.
The articulation of the implicit ideal and covenant are
statements of being unwilling to let the patients starve
to death. 'One could not be there and watch people die--to
starve to death, because of the pain associated with
starving. So, to seek the most humane thing to do for the
condition and in the situation, we (Norberg and her
associates) tried bottle feeding and by cuddling, found
that the lost sucking reflexes could be stimulated.
One may turn to the literature to support this practice
with the reversal of Erikson's states and Shakespeare's
comments on the ages of man. This type of care may be
challenged and rejected by others who may articulate
different strong guiding and evaluative principles. One
may legitimate the claim that, in fact, it does not accord
the appropriate level of dignity to a needy and limited
adult to use cuddling and bottle feeding, a way of care
appropriate to the developmental stage of the newborn and
infant. The caregiver with this view might argue that this
behaviour diminishes and ends in the young toddler, that
is, after this stage bottle feeding is no longer
appropriate and does not become so again. This is a quite
different level of moral ethical issue than that which
questions the appropriateness of the actions in terms of
use of professional time and extension of life without
potential for improved or restored level of functioning;
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though these and other questions indicate the complexity
of each epitomisation. It would not contribute to the
deeper issue to dismiss too readily the question of
appropriateness, with a response that we also bathe
patients who are unable to bathe themselves. Rather let
us learn to ask restatements of the question and new
questions. Let us also receive and appreciate differing
creative agencies expressing their moral ideal and vision
in articulation of the ethical good to be created.
Identification of Areas Calling For Paradigmatic Practice
Are there areas of need in nursing practice that are
calling to the profession for a heroic, paradigmatic
response today? Who are the persons likely to respond to
these situations? What moral ideal would they articulate?
How can the profession identify and prepare agents for
alternative forms of paradigmatic response?
Identification of Areas for Research
How do the various models for teaching ethics (Fry, 1989)
relate to the need for commitive and creative agency? Is
it reasonable to infer that there may be important
differences among these alternative teaching approaches and
the moral agency of the nurse in practice? The Clinical
Practice Model may be most useful in integration of content
from the other models, while providing also the format for
deeper analysis of the factors related to actuation of
moral agency.
The penultimate purpose of the thesis is to initiate
professional dialogue which should focus on development of
agency for actuation of moral decisions and ethical
actions. As individuals and as a profession we should
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encourage and call forth the fullest articulation and
epitomisations of strong evaluations and choices in areas
of yet to be defined practice. Even further, the writer's
ultimate intent is to challenge the profession to address
the expression of care as an experiment in paradigmity.
Are there nurses who are expressing strong evaluations from
within their styles of life, who are generating new
expectations and criteria for evaluation of the morally
good to be done? How is the principle of discrimination
of the needs and goods of practice related to actuating the
principle of performance in this moral agent's
epitomisation?
Nurses with developed powers of person and ethical agency,
are in possession of vision illuminated and irradiated in
deeds (actions) that shed their light in ever new
epiphanies from the silent working Word from the depths of
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